A few NotebookLM generated podcasts from Peter Cramton cover art

A few NotebookLM generated podcasts from Peter Cramton

A few NotebookLM generated podcasts from Peter Cramton

Written by: Peter Cramton
Listen for free

About this listen

Electrifying nearly everything is necessary as the world transitions to net zero carbon emissions. Electricity demand will double with rapid innovation in supply and demand. As the share of intermittent renewables, primarily solar and wind, grows and extreme weather events become more frequent, balancing supply and demand every second becomes more challenging. Restructured wholesale markets provide real-time balancing. The market determines clearing prices that balance supply and demand, motivating operations to maximize social welfare.

Prices vary by time and place. Electricity prices, typically about $40 per megawatt-hour, may be negative when renewable production is high and thousands of dollars during extreme weather. Participants attempt to manage this risk with forward trade, but several market failures limit risk management and undermine efficient investment. Electricity markets have struggled with these challenges for decades.

Our market platform addresses the critical market failures that have hindered efficient electricity investment and stifled innovation: incomplete markets, market power, and uncertainty. Once adopted, this research will expedite decarbonization. It leverages robust market designs to foster innovation and competition, bringing essential flexibility for reliable and resilient electricity in a setting with high renewable penetration. The research identifies the need to involve demand, particularly during extreme weather. Such a market significantly enhances price incentives, enabling efficient investment and operation of participants' resources. Notably, retail consumers stand to benefit from these reforms. The result is a net-zero economy that provides reliable and resilient electricity at the least cost.

The venture develops a forward energy market that aligns market participants' incentives with social welfare. The new market promotes competition and innovation through improved forward trading and improves investment incentives, reliability, and resilience to extreme events, avoiding a costly and inefficient capacity market. The market reforms are designed to be introduced by existing independent system operators. The process can be gradual and low-cost since core systems need not change. The open-source platform we are building and testing is highly customizable, recognizing that every system operator has its ideal adoption path.

The forward energy market allows frictionless, gradual trade of energy and related products that are defined finely in terms of time and location. It complements the system operator's spot market. The bidding language is designed for easy and effective participation, and market participants can tailor strategies to their circumstances.

Our team, comprising computer science, economics, applied math, and finance researchers, is leading a global effort to expedite the green energy transition while improving the reliability and resiliency of critical infrastructure. We have made enormous progress in developing ideas, building a proof-of-concept, and establishing ease of participation and robustness. These efforts will continue for many years through a continuous improvement and adoption cycle globally, underscoring the potential impact of our work on a global scale.

This podcast discusses the power of flow trading to allow efficient and transparent trade of time-and-location commodities like electricity, communications, and transportation. The approach maximizes social welfare, enabling market participants to manage needs and risks as information is revealed.

Peter Cramton 2025
Episodes
  • Soft-Floor Auctions: Harnessing Regret to Improve Efficiency and Revenue
    Apr 13 2025

    A soft-floor auction asks bidders to accept an opening price to participate in an ascending auction. If no bidder accepts, lower bids are considered using first-price rules. Soft floors are common despite being irrelevant with standard assumptions. When bidders regret losing, soft-floor auctions are more efficient and profitable than standard optimal auctions. Revenue increases as bidders are inclined to accept the opening price to compete in a regret-free ascending auction. Efficiency is improved since having a soft floor allows for a lower hard reserve price, reducing the frequency of no sale. Theory and experiment confirm these motivations from practice.

    The research paper is at https://cramton.umd.edu/auction/

    Bergemann, Dirk, Kevin Breuer, Peter Cramton, Jack Hirsch, Yero S. Ndiaye, and Axel Ockenfels, “Soft-Floor Auctions: Harnessing Regret to Improve Efficiency and Revenue,” University of Maryland Working Paper, April 2025.

    Show More Show Less
    13 mins
  • Canadian Mobile Broadband: An Open Access Future
    Apr 8 2025

    On 7 April 2025, TheFutureEconomy.ca published Peter Cramton's "The Future of Mobile Broadband Can Arrive Early in Canada." Cramton envisions a future for Canada's mobile broadband through an "open access" model. It critiques the current regulatory landscape involving the CRTC and ISED, which the author argues creates complexities and hinders innovation. Cramton proposes a shift towards a market design where spectrum holders must sell a portion of capacity in an open-access wholesale market managed by an independent operator. He contends this would foster greater competition, lower rates, and increased investment, ultimately benefiting consumers, regulators, and mobile operators alike. Professor Cramton argues a market based on continuous auctions for capacity offers a simpler and more efficient alternative to traditional regulatory instruments. Implementing open access would create a more future-proof and competitive digital ecosystem for Canada. His research lab has built an open-source platform for trade, which is freely available.

    Show More Show Less
    15 mins
  • Beyond the myths of social choice and a market design look at voting rules
    Mar 24 2025

    This episode discusses a foundational paper by David Pearce and an applied paper on voting rules by Peter Cramton and his co-authors.

    Economists’ conceptions of utility and welfare reflect misguided attempts to mimic the physical sciences. The resulting tangle of ideas about meaninglessness, cardinality, and measurability forms a pyramid of misunderstandings that supports the wildly inappropriate standard interpretation of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem. This paper is a quick primer on seeing past the myths. A natural reading of Arrow’s Theorem resolves the tension between abstract social choice theory and practical welfare analysis.

    No election rules are perfect, but they can be better. The Electoral College is increasingly failing to represent voter preferences in determining election winners. A path to reform begins with identifying election goals and establishing voting rules that best achieve these goals.

    The connection between the papers is discussed.

    Show More Show Less
    25 mins
No reviews yet