Jonathan discusses why enormously complex semiconductor production cannot easily be “nationalized,” but how the industry was never really offshored. What protests in China told us about Chinese citizens’ worries about monitoring and persecution versus censorship. Is iCloud finally going to be secure, and what does that tell us about the encryption policy debate?

Jonathan discusses the major evolution to commercial space, the drastic decrease in cost to reach orbit, and how to ensure security as companies scale up with automation to manage proliferated low-Earth orbit.

Jonathan argues that there is no cyber war; there's just war. Russia and Ukraine aren’t failing at cyber war, they are just using their capabilities in a way that we did not expect. Why did we make the mistake of assuming their capabilities would resemble ours? Also, how cyber will always be somewhat ungovernable, and how the implications of cyber defenses and other technologies may not be fully apparent for years after deployment.

Jonathan discusses the reported “Pipedream” Russian attack on U.S. natural gas infrastructure and whether it is a significant escalation. How does it compare to the Colonial Pipeline attack and the Stuxnet compromise of an Iranian nuclear facility? How vulnerable are industrial safety controls? Jonathan also discusses the difficulty of distinguishing between espionage and military action in cyber and whether VPNs increase or decrease security.

Joanthan discusses how Russian cyberwar capabilities are turning out to be different than expected in the Ukraine war, but not nonexistent. Moscow’s reported deployment of wipers indicate that Russia has developed capabilities in a different manner than we have, and that we make a mistake in assuming they would take the same path. Russia may also be holding back on attacking capabilities that it depends upon as much as the Ukrainians. He takes a deeper look at what we know so far.

Jonathan discusses how a victim of a North Korean cyber attack shut down that country's internet and whether companies can go on the offensive against cyber threats. He also ponders whether most “hacktivists” are in fact working for governments. Does the disablement of a Mazda via an image file from a HD radio station open up a new attack vector not previously considered? The FCC is pressing manufacturers and operators to harden satellites against cyber attack, but will this happen without the right incentives in place?

Jonathan discusses whether adding more computers and network connection to a car increase vulnerabilities. What are the comparative risks of that data cars receive, from radio packets to video to LiDAR? Furthermore, do we need new regulations on collecting data in public given the amount of information these cars will collect store?