Eastern Front #33 Back to Königsberg cover art

Eastern Front #33 Back to Königsberg

Eastern Front #33 Back to Königsberg

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 Last time we spoke about Stalin’s General Offensive. Stalin, buoyed by early Moscow-area and Rostov successes, ordered a broad encirclement strategy across multiple fronts; Center, North, Leningrad, and Ukraine, aiming to drain German reserves before spring. Zhukov warned that concentrated reserves and heavy tank support were essential, but Stalin and Stavka pushed a wide-front offensive, overestimating Red Army strength while underestimating logistics and fuel shortages. The result was a cascade of rushed operations, poor coordination, and insufficient artillery support, tempered by pockets of resilience at lower levels. On the German side, logistical strain, winter conditions, the Luftwaffe’s varied effectiveness, and stiff Soviet pressure forced ad hoc German withdrawals and rearguard acts. Brutal fighting broke out around Lake Ilmen, Volkhov, and the Bryansk corridor, with dramatic German political-military frictions and punitive measures for commanders who disobeyed or failed. This episode is Back to Königsberg Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. The Soviet Army had launched relentless attacks across the USSR against Army Group North and Army Group Center. Both groups had been driven into crisis, with breaches opening up at multiple points along their lines. Soviet formations continued to press deep behind German lines. Army Group Center faced a serious threat of encirclement, while Manstein conducted attacks in Crimea. After their three-day rest, the Volkhov Front had restarted their offensive on the 13th. This time, they fought with better organization and artillery support, although ammunition remained in short supply. Despite these improvements, the offensive still faced the challenge of being directed through roadless, snow-covered frozen swampland. This further strained the already stretched logistics, causing extreme shortages of all supplies. Moreover, Meretskov once again failed to concentrate strength against single points, instead dispersing his efforts over a wide area. With the offensive not meeting expectations, Meretskov continually begged for further reinforcements throughout the entire week. On the 19th january STAVKA sent 3,000 PPSh submachine guns (my favorite gun from Call of duty world at war) and 300 antitank rifles and released 9 ski battalions and an aerosleigh transport battalion to his control. The 2nd Shock Army moved to attack the junction of the 126th and 215th Infantry Divisions. The 126th had only recently arrived from France and was still acclimating to the harsh winter conditions. As the Soviet assault struck, they began to panic, allowing the 2nd Shock Army to push into the German defensive line. Yet the main strongpoints west of the Volkhov and Tigoda rivers withstood the assault. The flanking 4th and 52nd Armies achieved even less, and both units shifted to a defensive posture by the 15th. After regrouping, Klykov launched another assault on the 17th. With the support of over 1,500 sorties from the VVS, the 2nd Shock Army managed to pierce the first layer of German defenses and advanced up to 10 kilometers. Yet many vital German strongpoints remained standing, hindered by the same failures as before. David Glantz “poor command, control, and coordination, the dispersed nature of the assaults, and deteriorating weather conditions, and heavy losses.” The Leningrad Front’s 54th Army also attacked alongside the Volkhov Front starting on the 13th. Fediuninsky repeated Meretskov’s mistake by dispersing his offensive along the entire 30-kilometer frontline rather than concentrating efforts on a single point. Despite undermining his own offensive, they managed to capture Pogostye by the 17th, confronting a heavily reinforced 269th Infantry Division. This small gain, however, did not suffice to breach the German defensive lines. The remainder of the Leningrad Front stayed relatively quiet, with only a few minor attacks mounted from Leningrad and Oranienbaum. This allowed Leeb to pull sizable detachments from three divisions on the siege lines to reinforce the divisions engaging the Volkhov Front. The Luftwaffe and SS also dispatched detachments to this sector. This setback prompted Stalin to strip...
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