Case Summary:

Trump, President of the U.S. v. Cook arises from President Donald Trump’s attempt in August 2025 to remove Lisa Cook, a Senate-confirmed member of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors serving a 14‑year term, on the ground that she allegedly committed mortgage fraud before joining the Board by designating two different properties as her primary residence on separate loan applications. After the removal letter issued, Cook challenged the action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that the Federal Reserve Act’s “for cause” removal protection limits the President to removing a governor only for misconduct or failures in office and that alleged, disputed pre‑appointment mortgage irregularities do not qualify as valid cause. She also contended that, because her statutory, fixed‑term position created a protected property interest, the President violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by removing her without adequate advance notice of the charges and a meaningful opportunity to respond. The district court, treating her request for a temporary restraining order as a motion for a preliminary injunction, enjoined the President from removing Cook, finding that she was substantially likely to succeed on her statutory “for cause” and due process claims and that the equitable factors favored interim relief. The D.C. Circuit, by a 2–1 vote, declined to stay that injunction, leaving Cook in her position while the litigation proceeded and setting the stage for the President’s emergency application and subsequent review in the Supreme Court. The issue before the Supreme Court is whether the Court should stay (pause) the lower court’s preliminary injunction that currently prevents President Donald Trump from removing Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook while her challenge to the legality of that removal proceeds. In deciding whether to grant that stay, the Court must assess both the president’s statutory and constitutional authority to remove a for‑cause‑protected Fed governor on the basis of alleged pre‑appointment misconduct and the scope of judicial power to review and temporarily block such a presidential removal.

Case Summary:

M & K Employee Solutions v. Trustees of the IAM Pension Fund is a case about whether an employer is obligated to contribute to a multiemployer pension fund under a collective bargaining agreement and related plan documents, and whether the fund’s trustees correctly interpreted those documents when claiming contributions were owed, but a precise sentence‑format rule or holding cannot be given here because the necessary case details cannot be accessed at the moment.

Case Summary:

Wolford v. Lopez is a Second Amendment challenge to Hawaii’s law that makes it a crime for licensed handgun carriers to bring a firearm onto private property open to the public without the owner’s express permission, with the plaintiffs arguing this default ban unconstitutionally burdens public carry while the State defends it as consistent with historical regulations and property owners’ right to exclude, and the Supreme Court has not yet issued a decision in the case.

Case Summary:

Galette v. New Jersey Transit Corp. arises from an August 9, 2018 collision in Philadelphia, where Cedric Galette, riding as a passenger in a stopped vehicle driven by Julie McCrey, was injured when a New Jersey Transit bus struck their car. Galette sued McCrey and New Jersey Transit in Pennsylvania state court for negligence, and New Jersey Transit moved to dismiss, arguing it is an “arm of the State of New Jersey” entitled to interstate sovereign immunity from being sued in Pennsylvania; after the trial court and intermediate appellate court rejected that immunity claim, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed and held that New Jersey Transit is an instrumentality of New Jersey and thus immune from Galette’s suit. The issue before the U.S. Supreme Court is whether New Jersey Transit qualifies as an “arm of the State of New Jersey” entitled to sovereign immunity that bars it from being sued for damages in another state’s courts (here, Pennsylvania), and more broadly what test courts should use to decide when a bi‑state or cross‑border transit agency is treated as a state for sovereign‑immunity purposes.

Case Summary:

West Virginia v. B. P. J. arises from a challenge by Becky Pepper‑Jackson, a transgender girl in West Virginia, to the state’s “Save Women’s Sports Act,” which bars transgender girls and women from competing on girls’ and women’s school sports teams. As an 11‑ to 15‑year‑old middle‑ and high‑school runner who has taken puberty blockers and publicly lived as a girl for years, she sued the state education authorities and West Virginia after the law threatened to exclude her from her school’s girls’ cross‑country and track‑and‑field teams, alleging that enforcing the statute against her violates Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause by denying her any meaningful opportunity to participate in girls’ sports on the same terms as other girls. The issue before the Supreme Court is whether West Virginia’s “Save Women’s Sports Act,” which categorically bars transgender girls from playing on girls’ school sports teams, violates Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause as applied to a transgender girl who has been treated consistent with her gender identity and seeks to compete on her school’s girls’ cross‑country and track teams.

Case Summary;

Little v. Hecox arises from Idaho’s 2020 “Fairness in Women’s Sports Act” (HB 500), which bars transgender girls and women, and any student designated male at birth, from competing on female sports teams at public schools and public colleges, and includes a sex‑verification process that can require invasive exams if an athlete’s sex is disputed. Lindsay Hecox, a transgender woman and student at Boise State University who wanted to compete on the women’s cross‑country team, together with a cisgender high‑school girl concerned about being subjected to sex verification, sued Idaho officials including Governor Brad Little, alleging that the law violates the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX by excluding her from women’s sports based solely on her sex assigned at birth and transgender status; a district court enjoined the law, the Ninth Circuit upheld that injunction, and Idaho then sought Supreme Court review. The issue before the Supreme Court is whether a state law that limits participation in girls’ and women’s sports to “biological females” (as defined by the statute) violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the background of that merits question, the Court is also being asked whether the case has become moot because Lindsay Hecox has left competition and sought to dismiss her claims, and, if so, what should happen to the Ninth Circuit’s decision that upheld the injunction against Idaho’s law.

Case Summary:

Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish grows out of a set of Louisiana coastal‑damage suits in which Plaquemines Parish and other local governments allege that Chevron and other oil and gas companies’ decades of exploration and production activities in the coastal zone, such as dredging canals, drilling, and failing to comply with Louisiana’s State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act permitting scheme, eroded wetlands and harmed waterways, and seek money damages and restoration costs. Chevron, a vertically integrated company that both produced crude oil in Louisiana and refined aviation gasoline for the federal government during World War II under federal contracts, removed the parish suits from state court to federal court under the federal‑officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), arguing that its challenged production activities were “connected or associated with” its federally directed wartime refining work, but the district courts and the Fifth Circuit held that the complaints targeted only crude‑oil production and related permitting practices not directed by federal contracts and therefore ordered the cases remanded to state court. The issue before the Supreme Court is whether Chevron can rely on the federal‑officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), to remove these Louisiana coastal‑damage suits to federal court based on its World War II–era federal refining contracts, even though the parish complaints on their face challenge only state‑law coastal‑zone production activities and permitting noncompliance, not the federally directed refining work.

Case Summary:

Cox Communications v. Sony Music Entertainment arises from a suit by Sony and other record labels alleging that Cox’s internet customers used its service to download and share pirated music, after Cox received millions of infringement notices identifying specific subscriber accounts. In the Eastern District of Virginia, Sony proceeded on theories of contributory and vicarious copyright infringement, presenting evidence that Cox knew particular subscribers were repeatedly infringing yet chose not to terminate their service and operated an intentionally lax “repeat infringer” policy that disqualified it from the DMCA safe harbor. A jury found Cox liable for willful contributory and vicarious infringement of 10,017 works and awarded $1 billion in statutory damages, and the Fourth Circuit later upheld contributory liability while rejecting vicarious liability and vacating the damages award. The issue before the Supreme Court is whether a defendant can be held liable for contributory copyright infringement based on a jury instruction that allowed liability if Cox “knew or should have known” of its subscribers’ infringing activity, or whether contributory infringement instead requires proof that the defendant actually knew of specific acts of infringement (or was willfully blind to them)