In this episode of Strategy Matters, we explore the strategic logic behind the formation of NATO in the aftermath of World War II. The discussion examines the post-World War world from Western and Soviet perspectives and highlights how economic challenges, political instability, and ideological competition shaped early Cold War security decisions. Guests Dr. David Stone and Dr. Timothy Hoyt emphasize the alliance as a solution to European post-war challenges and contrast NATO with earlier failed efforts at collective security. The episode closes by exploring enduring lessons about alliance credibility and the importance of aligning all instruments of national power in coalitions.

The opinions expressed on this podcast represent the views of the presenters and do not reflect the official position of the Department of War, The US Navy, or US Naval War College.

Guests:

Dr. Timothy Hoyt, Ph.D. is the John Nicholas Brown Chair of Counterterrorism and, since 2019, has also served as the Director of the Advanced Strategy Program at the U.S. Naval War College. He is the author of numerous publications on irregular warfare, COIN and counterterrorism, and South Asia. Dr Hoyt also serves as the Deputy Editor of The Journal of Strategic Studies.

Dr. David Stone, Ph.D., the William E. Odom Professor of Russian Studies, joined the Strategy and Policy Department in 2015. He received a B.A. from Wabash College and a Ph.D. in history from Yale. He previously taught at Kansas State University. His book “Hammer and Rifle: The Militarization of the Soviet Union” (2000) won the Shulman Prize and the Best First Book Prize of the Historical Society. He has also published “A Military History of Russia” (2006) and “The Russian Army in the Great War: The Eastern Front, 1914-1917” (2015). He edited “The Soviet Union at War, 1941-1945” (2010). He is the author of several dozen articles on Russian military history and foreign policy.

Episode ten of Strategy Matters aligns with the fourth case study in the Strategy and Policy Course at the Naval War at the U.S. Naval War College. Much of the case study focuses on the European theaters of World War I, but in the podcast, we are exploring the extra-European or colonial theaters of the conflict. Although distinct, they were seldom decisive. Nonetheless, the colonial theaters in WWI hold many lessons for today’s strategists, including the complexities of peripheral theaters and irregular warfare, the role of seapower in a global conflict, and recruitment and motivation to fight. The host, Dr. Vanya Eftimova Bellinger, is joined by two professors from the Strategy and Policy Department: Dr. Tim Hoyt and Dr. Jesse Tumblin. A renowned expert on irregular warfare, Dr. Hoyt examines why, despite much action in the colonial theaters, they failed to break the stalemate or shift the balance between the belligerents. A historian of the British Empire, Dr. Tumblin discusses how the dominions provided it with manpower and enormous resources, but also challenged the empire’s institutions and war strategy.

The opinions expressed on this podcast represent the views of the presenters and do not reflect the official position of the Department of War, The US Navy, or US Naval War College.

Guests:

Dr. Timothy Hoyt, Ph.D. is the John Nicholas Brown Chair of Counterterrorism and, since 2019, has also served as the Director of the Advanced Strategy Program at the U.S. Naval War College. He is the author of numerous publications on irregular warfare, COIN and counterterrorism, and South Asia. Dr Hoyt also serves as the Deputy Editor of The Journal of Strategic Studies.

Dr. Jesse Tumblin, Ph.D. is an assistant professor of strategy and policy specializing in political and military history, ideas of security, and the current and former British world. He earned a Ph.D. and M.A. from Boston College and a B.A. from the University of Tennessee. He is a past fellow in international security studies at Yale University. He is the author of “The Quest for Security: Sovereignty, Race, and the Defense of the British Empire, 1898-1931” (Cambridge University Press, 2020) and an article on Britain’s attempts to secure its Indo-Pacific empire, which won the Saki Ruth Dockrill Memorial Prize for international history from the Institute for Historical Research, University of London.

Episode Nine of Strategy Matters aligns with the third case study in the Strategy and Policy Course at the Naval War at the U.S. Naval War College. In this episode, we shift our focus on the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars to explore how the military and political upheavals of 1793–1815 shaped strategic thinking in the early American republic. Although the United States stayed largely out of the European conflicts, American leaders watched them closely, and the era profoundly influenced how they understood war, strategy, and national power. Host Brendan Neagle is joined by three guests from the Strategy and Policy Department: Dr. George Satterfield, an expert on European military history, Dr. Jon Romaneski, a military historian focused on early U.S. military history, and Dr. Vanya Eftimova Bellinger, scholar of Clausewitz and co-host of Strategy Matters. The episode closes with key takeaways from each guest on Napoleon’s enduring relevance for contemporary strategic thought.

The opinions expressed on this podcast represent theviews of the presenters and do not reflect the official position of the Department of War, The US Navy, or US Naval War College.

Guests:

Dr. George Satterfield, Ph.D. holds a Ph.D. in history from the University of Illinois (2001) and an M.A. in history from Illinois State University. Before joining the Strategy and Policy Department, he taught history at the post-secondary level in New York and New Jersey. In 2006, he was a faculty member at Hawaii Pacific University, and at the same time, he won a distinguished book award for his book “Princes, Posts, and Partisans: The Army of Louis XIV and Partisan Warfare in the Spanish Netherlands, 1673-1678 (Leiden: Brill, 2003).” Professor Satterfield has expanded his interests to include modern European history, general military and naval history, counterinsurgency and NATO.

Lieutenant Colonel Jon Romaneski, U.S. Army, is a military professor in the US Naval War College’s Strategy and Policy Department. He is a U.S. Army Aviation officer whose previous command and staff positions include extensive time in Europe, the U.S. Military Academy, Fort Carson, Colorado, and Fort Cavazos, Texas. His most recent assignment was his battalion command tour in Fort Wainwright, Alaska. He has a BA in history from James Madison University and a PhD in military history from the Ohio State University.

Dr. Vanya Eftimova Bellinger, Ph.D. earned a Ph.D. in history at King’s College, London. Bellinger is the author of “Marie von Clausewitz: The Woman Behind the Making of On War” (Oxford University Press USA, 2015). She is the winner of the 2016 Society for Military History Moncado Prize for her article, “The Other Clausewitz: Findings from the Newly Discovered Correspondence between Marie and Carl von Clausewitz.” She is the first scholar to work with the newly discovered correspondence between the Clausewitz couple. Before transitioning to academia, Bellinger worked as a journalist and international correspondent for various European outlets.