The Symbolic is not at one with itself, which means that knowing through representation is not only mediated through language but also shifty. However, it is the immediacy of this "shiftiness" that allows for knowing to be a dynamic, experimental flow that reflects the dynamism of being as a process of becoming. Hermeneutics is the sort of shifty knowing that reflects the provisional nature of both knowing and the experience of becoming. The shiftiness within is not disingenuous but the abyss from which all hermeneutical ingenuity emerges, and what allows us to become constantly new by becoming other than ourselves.

Jean-Luc Marion divides "Saturate Phenomena" into those aspects that can be taken in to ourselves through the intention and those that are intuited. There is a mismatch between intentional, phenomenological representation and immediate, affective intuition. Saturated Phenomena are defined by the too-much-givenness of the intuition that cannot be reduced by the symbolic intention to phenomenal and conceptual objects. The intuition then is a kind of awareness of "over-proximal affects" that can't be symbolize, so that they are in the Lacanian register of the Real, which is the absolute resistance to symbolization. It is this unsymbolizable otherness that connects the abyss within to the abyss without, and which allows being's becoming to be the experimental interpretation of the hermeneutical circle.

The shift from phenomenology to hermeneutics is the shift from intentional identification in the Symbolic register to the provisional, shifty interpretation in the resister of the Real through the Lacanian Imaginary.

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Formal Phenomenology began with Edmund Husserl's attempt to discover the ground of phenomenal appearances and the relations between these appearances and the "things-in-themselves." His "Eidetic Reduction" hoped to reduce the internal intention of the subject to increase the external intention of what shows itself to the subject, so that what is other than the subject might show itself from its own intention without the interference of the subject's presuppositions, which are a reflection of the subject's intention and not of the Other that appears on the subject's intentional screen. The problem with the Eidetic reduction was that it was the subject's presuppositions that allow the Other to appear at all. What is outside and other to the subject must be brought into the subject, or appear to the subject, via an interpretive frame work, starting with Kant's "A Priori Categories" for basic perception and ending with the concepts given to human subjectivity by their collective Imaginary and Symbolic registers for more advanced "understanding."

Things-in-themselves aren't things or objects. They must be in relation with an outside or with otherness or with the intention of another because objects are reified by relations of difference according to physical rules, perceptual apparatuses or concepts. The outside co-arrises with the inside as a relation of difference governed by the natural laws, perceptual categories, and by the signifiers of minded things. The internal parts of an object are made whole by the intention of the whole, but the wholeness of an object isn't isolated within its objectification, but rather it is a relational intention or an intention extended into its outside environment. Evolution by natural selection is a principle that relates bodily objectification to "niche" intention, so that the body of an organism reflects its niche in its biome.

In phenomenology this co-arising of inside and outside as objectification is articulated as the necessity of consciousness to be about something, or to have an object, so that internal subjectivity is given by the difference of external objectivity, or otherness. Unconscious, or reactive, co-variable arising, or causality, is the physically determined intentionality of material objects. Non-physical, conscious intentionality is awareness-of, which in phenomenology is awareness "of" a different or other intention outside of the internal intention. In psychology the "Theory of Mind" is the awareness of the "mindedness," or of the "subjectivity" of the Other.

However, the psychoanalytic subject does not have an objectifiable intention as other objects do. There will always be a remainder of irreducible ambiguity after an Eidetic reduction is intentionally performed. And this resistance to identity or to intentional conceptualization is what is singular or different or other about the psychoanalytic subject, not only about the outside other but also about the internal other of the subject itself. Psychoanalysis is hermeneutical in natural rather than phenomenological because the irreducible otherness of subjectification requires interpretation rather than phenomenological reduction to objects.

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The self / other relationship of being's becoming is the center piece of both phenomenology and of hermeneutics and can help explain why there was a general shift from phenomenology to hermeneutics in theory beginning with Heidegger and culminating in the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur. This shift was not a total rejection of Phenomenology but an acknowledgement that the goal of Husserlian phenomenology of the "Eidetic Reduction" wasn't possible given the inherent perspectivalism of the showing of being and of the knowing of being. Things may show themselves "from" themselves but they can't appear "as" themselves to another without the other's interpretation of their showing. Any possible appearance of being must appear through an interpretive apparatus or some kind, whether that be a biological mechanism like a sensory system, or a symbolic system of differences like a language.

But mediation doesn't necessarily lessen the immediacy of being. It may be that mediated being is being showing itself to itself as another, but it may simultaneously be true that the interpretation of being is the immediacy of being's becoming through the mediation of perception and conceptualization, a becoming in which some degrees of freedom are actuated by the immediate distantiation of being from itself as an object for itself. This distantiation of being from itself injects indeterminacy into determinate being, which is the space of nonbeing necessary for being to appear to itself and to know itself as itself through otherness. The relation of being to its other, which is nonbeing, is being's becoming as an immediate, dialectical process "for" itself, or "Being-for-itself" rather than "Being-in-itself," as Hegel outlined. In whatever way Being-in-itself is "immediate," it is so immediate that it can't be "for" itself because it is without the relationality of "for-ness" or any other sort of prepositionally given appearance or knowing.

The relationality of "otherness" is the ground of any possible appearance of being "to" or "for" itself, so phenomenology must included hermeneutical interpretation without the totalizing reduction that Husserl called "Eidetic," which would mean the identification and defining of an eternal, unchanging essence or substance. Any reduction of an appearance to knowing must include the indeterminacy of otherness's irreducible ambiguity and thus precludes any complete determination of an identity. Every possible identification includes the otherness of misidentification.

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There may be actual degrees of freedom in the register of Imaginary if it is possible to relate determinate being to the open indeterminacy of the void. Jean-Luc Marion's Saturated Phenomena relate the objective determinations of the intention to the failure to determine of the affective intuition as the indeterminable hermeneutics of too much givenness, or of too much aboutness for the intention to reify into phenomenal or conceptual objects. Is it possible that this affective intuition cannot be fully determined because it intuits the irreducible ambiguity of actual indeterminacy, something like the indeterminacy or superposition of Quantum? If this were the case, then this irreducible ambiguity would contain actual degrees of freedom, particularly the freedom of the non-local, symbolic imagination to project itself into the abyss of meaning to generate new semantic meanings and virtual worlds that have real effects on being, or are ontologically real themselves, as virtuality is for Deleuze.

For Hegel determinate being can step outside of itself, or self-alienate, to imagine itself as an object. It is the lack of total objectification of and in the subjective intention, or the lack of symbolic interpolation, that constitutes the subject's "singularity" in Zizek's formulation, or that allows for some relative degrees of freedom in the register of the Imaginary. The Real is the absolute resistance to the symbolization and the objectification of the intention, but the Imaginary can imagine into, or across, the open spaces of the Real outside of and within determinate being. Lack of interpolation can also be seen as the excess of indeterminate being that allows for an excess of interpretations, which is too much being to determine. There is too much being because being is an indeterminate becoming, which is always becoming more than what the signifiers and concepts of the Symbolic can frame, so that there is an ongoing need for concept creation. It is this excess of being beyond objectification that allows for the imaginary freedom of interpretation. The interpretation of determinate being is the freedom of the symbolic imagination given by the indeterminacy of the void.

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Whatever degrees of freedom we may have, they seem to be "contained" in the Imaginary. The Lacanian Imaginary makes whole and complete what is neither whole nor complete, which is the Real. But it is this "non-relation" between wholeness in the Register of the Imaginary and "lack" in the Register of the Real that allows our imaginary projections into the void to be somewhat indeterminate, or to contain relative degrees of freedom. These imaginary projections are types of illusions, which might be thought of in terms of the Lacanian virtual object that he called "Object-small-a." Virtual objects appear as if real, even though they are imaginary projections. Lacanian psychoanalysis was to open up whatever degrees of freedom are available to the analysand by "traversing the fantasy" of this virtual projection. The analysand must distantiate from the virtual object enough to realize the difference between the object of desire, which is what the fantasy is projected on to, and the object-cause-of-desire, which is the obstacle that constitutes the imaginary projection as a positivization of lack. The freedom of the Imaginary is given by the realization of this gap because it is the gap of indeterminacy in determinate being that is given by the void of nonbeing. And it is the indeterminacy of desire that allows for a reinterpretation of a determinate symptom.

The relation between being and nonbeing gives the open indeterminacy of virtuality, which might be thought of as the relative degrees of freedom contained in "actual possibility." The virtual does have a sort of reality because as Deleuze put it, the virtual is "actualized" but not "realized" possibility. The phenomenological intention works in this same way. It imagines noumenal reality as phenomenal objects. We perceive the world in Gestalt Wholes, not as it is "in-itself." Our freedom is given to us when the wholes given by the concepts of the Symbolic fail to be whole, which is the gap given by the relation of whole objects to what resists objectification completely, which is the Lacanian Real. Zizek formulates this freedom as the failure of the Symbolic to interpolate being in the register of the Real. For example, our personal identity is singular because our "irreducible ambiguity," in Levinas's famous locution, cannot be interpolated into the Symbolic. We are the relation formed at the intersection of the Symbolic and its failure, and this relation is indeterminate. Our freedom is exactly here with this indeterminacy, which Heidegger formulated as determinate being's relation to the void, or the creativity of the imagination. Paul Ricoeur's Hermeneutics demonstrate how this imaginal freedom is properly employed.

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Hermeneutics is the study of interpretation. Phenomenology is the study of how things appear. Both studies have had to concede a sort of "perspectivalism" because disclosure, or "unconcealment," is always through the "thrownness," or particularity, of a given position that Heidegger called being's "facticity." The sciences have tried to rid first-person observation of perspective by claiming "third-person" objectivity, but intentional objects, including the objects of the sciences, have a remainder of ambiguity, or "difference," that will not be completed or made whole because of the ineluctability of perspective's locatedness. Every identification has at least a bit of misrecognition about it because there is no omniscient position from which to view a situation objectively without aspects of the object "withdrawing" from the observer, like the back sides of three-dimensional objects. Even though the withdrawn aspects of objects can be inferred, there is no meta-position to directly verify that they are there. Because being cannot be seen all at once, there will always be room for interpretation. Hermeneutics is the freedom of the symbolic intention to hold being's indeterminacy differently without closure. It is in the clash of interpretations that new concepts are created and being is renewed.

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Jean-Luc Marion's "Saturated Phenomenon" produce "indeterminable hermeneutics." Indeterminable hermeneutics can either be a blessing or a curse because they are counter to our intention. What we cannot intend is what Marion called the "non-object," which is the "object" of all saturated phenomena. Soren Kierkegaard was perhaps the first to articulate the anxiety produced by the non-object of the void. Sigmund Freud defined fear as having an object and anxiety as without one. Jacques Lacan then positivized this negativity with his formulation that "anxiety is not without an object." Because the hermeneutics of the non-object can't be determined, no one interpretation can become totalizing. The gift of the negativity of non-closure is that interpretations can be put in relation with each other without one becoming dominant. The "clash" of interpretations, as Paul Ricoeur might have put it, produce "semantic innovations" in the irresolution of their relations. But how does one avoid the "lazy relativism" of intellectual tolerance that David Tracy warned about. In the patronizing acceptance of all interpretations, including indefensible ones, one loses sight of the truth. If the public relating of interpretations are to make a community of interpreters, then they must offer public reasons for these interpretations?

The disjunction between the intention and the intuition in Saturated Phenomena are not so much a disjunction as a relation, in particular, the relation that Lacan outlined as that between the Symbolic and the Real. Every attempt at an interpretation is an attempt to symbolize the Real, but the Real's resistance to symbolization is absolute. But the gift of the Real is the constant renewal of the interpretive intention. Paul Ricoeur thought of this relation as that of the dialectic between language's universality and the particularity of difference that allowed for imaginal creativity. Much like the Lacanian Imaginary, Ricoeur's imaginal creativity makes whole, but by bringing difference into relation without the resolution of completion, which is the non-completion of the Lacanian "Non-Relation." For both thinkers this wholeness can be the relation between wholeness and its failure, which might be thought of as wholeness without completion or intention without oneness, which would be the necessary ground of the multiplicity of a possible hermeneutic community.

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The connection between Jean-Luc Marion (1946-present) and Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005), besides both being French, Catholic philosophers who each taught at the University of Chicago Divinity School, is "indeterminable hermeneutics." Ricoeur's work at the University of Chicago preceded Marion's, and they were certainly aware of each other but neither directly referred to each other's work in majorly significant ways. Ricoeur developed a sort of theology of hermeneutics by changing the project of Husserlian phenomenology from the "eidetic reduction," which identified the objective essence of a phenomenon, to the hermeneutic interplay of multiple, irreducible interpretations or meanings. For Ricoeur what a things was, was indeterminable accept through the clash of multiple semantic meanings that produced a sort of revelation of the "things in themselves" as not in themselves but in the clash of interpretations of them, which bares some resemblance to Husserl's technic of "eidetic variation," but without out any reduction to a single intentional stance towards the essence or identity of a thing. Marion also changed the end goal of the "eidetic reduction" but he kept the language of "letting things show themselves as themselves." However, what showed itself was from elsewhere and therefore invited an interminable play of contrary hermeneutic variations. For both Marion and Ricoeur, the too-much-givenness of elsewhere, which might be thought of as the too-much otherness of the Other, results in the failure to reduce otherness to a single intention or identity. But otherness is both the failure of identity and the ground of it, or put in a more Levinasian formulation, as Ricoeur did, the ground of becoming of "self as Other," in which the interior intention and exterior other become in dialectical relation to each other's unknowable intention, like Meister Eckhart's God beyond God who reveals and hides in the same movement.

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