In this episode, Anita and Simon kindly passed the reigns to YRes members Abigail and Natalie to pick the brains of Alison Bull (Partner at Mills and Reeve) and Philip Barnsley (Partner and Head of Family at Higgs) regarding questions posed by other YRes members.

Referred to by many as Resolution Royalty, Alison and Philip are both experts in their field, having hosted the finance update at Resolutions National conference for several years.

The episode starts by considering some of the signs to look for when domestic abuse is an issue in a case, including when the clients themselves don’t recognise it. Alison highlights the importance of asking domestic abuse screening questions and shares the following resources:

· Domestic abuse screening information via Resolution website - Domestic Abuse Screening Information | Resolution

· Family mediation council guidance - Mediation-Screening-and-Assessment-Resource-Final-Draft-for-Consultation-Updated.pdf

Phil then goes on to discuss conduct in financial remedy proceedings, whether we should plead it and the practical implications of doing so, as well as the different schools of thought currently developing through case law.

Cases mentioned:

· N v J [2024] EWFC 184

· Tsvetkov v Khayrova [2023] EWFC 130

· LP v MP [2025] EWFC 473

· Wei-Lyn Loh v Ardal Loh-Gronager [2025] EWFC 483

· OG v AG (Financial Remedies: Conduct) [2020] EWFC 52

Other resources mentioned:

· The Law and Disorder Podcast hosted by Nicholas Mostyn, Helena Kennedy and Charlie Falconer

· Resolution Report “Domestic abuse in financial remedy proceedings”

Alison and Phil also consider Form E preparation and the importance of case strategy generally, as well as pitching capital needs and income needs budgets. Alison notes, anecdotally, the difference in approach between contested proceedings and mediation and questions to what extent AI might change things.

Cases mentioned:

· AH v BH [2024] EWFC 125

The episode concludes with discussion around spousal maintenance and the difficulties many face when advising clients given the uncertainty of the current law.

On the 22nd October 2025, it was announced that the government is going to repeal the presumption of parental involvement in s1(2A) of the Children Act 1989. Our hosts Simon Blain and Anita Mehta, ask Mary McKaskill (National Centre for Social Research), Natalie Sutherland (International Family Law Group LLP) and Sarah Williams (Forsters) about what the research to support that change shows and what it means in practice.

Natalie reminds us that the recommendation to review this section appeared in the Harm Report from June 2020. The MOJ announced that there would be a review in November 2020 and this is the report.

The review of the presumption of parental involvement involved three research projects commissioned by the MOJ. Mary was the Lead Researcher in the team that undertook the judgment analysis. They reviewed 245 judgments from eight courts including one in Wales. There was also a literature review of academic papers and grey literature by Alma Economics and qualitative research in the form of interviews with Black, Asian and Ethnic minorities by the Race Equality Foundation. The MOJ report Review of the Presumption of Parental Involvement: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/68f5f5c206e6515f7914c7e3/Review_of_the_Presumption_of_Parental_Involvement_Final_Report_.pdf

Mary was clear that the judgment analysis had to grapple with challenges such as variability of data, lack of accessibility, struggling to find records of the actual judgment, the detail of the specifics of the order or how a specific decision was reached. There is also always a risk of bias or that certain experiences were not captured given this was a sample. Nevertheless, the report does find:

1. More times than not, some form of child arrangement is ordered. The report found that the courts did follow a ‘no stone unturned’ approach to foster involvement with both parents even where there was found to be a risk of harm.
2. That it was not possible to understand from the study what weight the presumption had in decision making.
3. However, involvement was almost always ordered, even where there were risks, so the report expresses concern that this is in contradiction with the child’s welfare.

The report was unable to explore the long-term impact of the orders that are being made, which would require a longitudinal study.

Natalie and Sarah go on to discuss the impact of this report, together with the review of the first pathfinder pilot, ‘Understanding the Experience of Children and Families’ https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/695544d06a4ea67a402a839c/Private_Law_Pathfinder_Pilot.pdf

Natalie noted that in the review of Pathfinder, there were parents who appreciated the efficiency of Pathfinder, but others who felt they had not been heard. Sarah was concerned that Pathfinder is dependent on support being provided from charitable partners and that is dependent on their availability. Natalie considered whether the removal of review hearings has had an impact on outcomes, and whether this should have remained part of Pathfinder.

Mary concludes by telling us that the report found that the voice of the child is not heard in private law proceedings. The finding was that children’s voices were amplified when they agreed with the Court, i.e. wanting contact but diminished when they did not.

In/Fertility in the City – Natalie’s podcast with Somaya Ouzzani, can be accessed on their webpage: https://infertilityinthecity.com/.

Should misconduct be taken into account when an equitable division of assets is being attempted following a divorce?

This is an extra special episode where we joined forces with the well-known legal podcast, Law & Disorder, hosted by Charlie Falconer (Labour peer and former Lord Chancellor), Baroness Helena Kennedy, Sir Nicholas Mostyn. Sadly, Charlie Falconer could not join us on the day of the recording.

Together they talk about financial remedy cases as it was, is and could possibly be, as our understanding of complex issues like domestic abuse and coercive control evolve.

Our listeners will be especially interested to hear Sir Nicholas Mostyn’s insights as he reflects on this complex issue.

The Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 received royal assent on the 12th November 1975. We celebrate its 50th birthday with Emily Roskilly (Roskilly & Co) and Alexander Learmonth KC (New Square Chambers).

Everyone needs a broad hinterland behind their specialist practice. Therefore, it is no good being a family practitioner and not knowing your way around the Inheritance Act, because at some point we will be acting for a family where one of the litigants dies. This podcast will tell you all you need to know!

Alex tells us who can be in the category of claimants in s1 of the 1975 Act, and the Court’s powers in s2 which are very similar to the Court’s powers on divorce although there are no powers to make orders in respect of pensions. Alex refers us to the Law Commission report ‘Second Report on Family Property: Family Provision on Death" (Law Com No 61)’ which indicates that the Act was intended to make sure spouses were treated the same on death as they would have been on divorce.

Emily tells us that the focus of the test for an award in respect of spouse or cohabitee is the statutory test of what is a reasonable financial provision. For a spouse, s1(2)(a) provides that this means such financial provision as it would be reasonable in all the circumstances of the case for a husband or wife to receive, whether or not that provision is required for his or her maintenance. For civil partner claims the same applies. For cohabitees and others such as adult children, s1(2)(aa) and s1(2)(b) provide that reasonable financial provision means such financial provision as it would be reasonable in all the circumstances of the case for the applicant to receive for his or her maintenance.

These claims can be brought in the County Court, or in the High Court either in the Family Division or the Business and Property Courts. There remains an anomaly that they cannot be issued in the Family Court, although the Family Division may assign them to an FRC Judge. The effect of having a choice of Court means that you need to think about which Court is likely to lead to a better outcome for your client.

Emily draws our attention to the relevant factors that the Court has to consider in s3. Both Alex and Emily agree that conduct is rarely relevant in these claims and it must be gross and obvious.

Emily then goes on to tell us about the different provision for spouses or civil partners and cohabitants in these cases. Cohabitees need to have been living with the deceased for two years immediately preceding death and living together as though husband and wife or civil partners.

Alex and Emily wrestle with whether prenups would be given weight and conclude that as a matter of principle they would be, with the same caveats that would be applied in the divorce court. We also discussed Cohabitation Agreements, and Emily noted that if it was a long term cohabiting relationship and there was a historic Cohabitation Agreement, although it would show intention or wishes, she could not see it being a closed door for the potential applicant.

We are joined by Rebecca Bailey-Harris (1 Hare Court) who was the first junior barrister for Mr Standish, and Sam Longworth (Stewarts) who was the lead partner for Mr Standish.

Rebecca tells us that the five principles in the judgment are:

1. There is a conceptual distinction between matrimonial and non-matrimonial property. In general terms, this distinction turns on the source of the assets. Non-matrimonial property is typically pre-marital property brought into the marriage by one of the parties or property acquired by one of the parties by external inheritance or gift. In contrast, matrimonial property is property that comprises the fruits of the marriage partnership or reflects the marriage partnership or is the product of the parties’ common endeavour [para 47];
2. That the sharing principle only applies to matrimonial property and does not apply to non-matrimonial property [para 49];
3. Sharing matrimonial property should normally be on an equal basis. Although there can be justified departures from that, equal sharing is the appropriate and principled starting position [para 50];
4. What starts as non-matrimonial property may become matrimonial property; “matrimonialisation”. What is important is to consider how the parties have been dealing with the asset and whether this shows that, over time, they have been treating the asset as shared between them. That is, matrimonialisation rests on the parties, over time, treating the asset as shared.
5. The final principle relates directly to matrimonialisation in the context of the facts of this case. In relation to a scheme designed to save tax, under which one spouse transfers an asset to the other spouse, the parties’ dealings with the asset, irrespective of the time period involved, do not normally show that the asset is being treated as shared between them. Rather the intention is simply to save tax.

Rebecca and Sam go on to talk about what might constitute dealing with the asset and whether this shows that, over time, they have been treating the asset as shared between them, and how intention is a component of that test. They discuss that the Supreme Court specifically disapproved of Moylan LJ saying “the concept of matrimonialisation should be applied narrowly” in the Court of Appeal. Therefore, although the Supreme Court says in terms matrimonialisation is neither narrow nor wide, many of us are likely to consider the test is wider than we previously understood it to be.

Rebecca and Sam wrestle with the question of whether there will be a difference in how matrimonial property that has always been matrimonial, as opposed to property that has been matrimonialised will be treated.

We finish with some quick-fire questions about how to apply these principles to scenarios that crop up all the time:

• Inheritances – cash and property;
• A property purchased prior to marriage;
• Business acquired prior to purchase.

This month we are joined Anna Lintner (Maitland Chambers) and Gareth Schofield (Clarke Willmott) to discuss the interconnection between bankruptcy and financial remedy cases. For this episode, Anita is joined by guest host, Matthew Taylor (Stowe Family Law) who is a member of Resolution’s Pension, Tax and Financial Remedy Committee. Matthew is an experienced podcaster as one of the presenters of Stowe Talks https://www.stowefamilylaw.co.uk/stowe-talks/

We have called this episode ‘The Final Frontier’ because, for most of our practice, we do not need to know about bankruptcy. Then suddenly you get a case where one of the parties is about to declare themselves bankrupt, or is already bankrupt, and suddenly you need to know all about this unexplored area.

Gareth mentions that he was one of the authors of Debt and Insolvency on Family Breakdown; https://www.abebooks.co.uk/book-search/title/debt-insolvency-family-breakdown/author/wendy-boyce/ and refers us to some of the key cases where family law and insolvency law interact being:

• Ball v Jones [2008] 2 FLR 1969 - where the Trustees in Bankruptcy was unable to challenge a consent order which had allowed the non-bankrupt to retain a much greater share of the assets;
• Haines v Hill and Another [2007] EWCA Civ 1284 - which is a Court of Appeal authority about how family law and insolvency work where consent orders are in place;
• Whig v Whig [2007] EWHC 1856 and Paulin v Paulin [2009] EWCA civ – in respect of annulling a bankruptcy;
• and Paulin v Paulin [2009] EWCA civ 221 – annulment cases with family law context and the risks of taking on a trustee in bankruptcy.

Anna tells us the important rule we must know about in bankruptcy is the pari-pasu rule, which means all unsecured creditors must be treated equally, which includes the bankrupt’s award in financial remedy proceedings.

Anna tells us that the Trustee in Bankruptcy cannot compel the bankrupt to draw their pension so that maybe one asset that can be preserved (Horton v Henry [2016] EWCA Civ 989)

We conclude with the importance of thinking about drafting and enforcement where there is a prospect of bankruptcy after the final financial remedy.