Ellingburg v. United States | Case No. 24-482 | Docket Link: Here

1. Opinion: Here.
2. Oral Argument: Here
3. Case Preview: Here

Overview: Ellingburg committed a crime in 1996 before Congress enacted a new law requiring convicted defendants to pay restitution to victims. Courts later sentenced Ellingburg under this new law and ordered him to pay $7,567.25 - money he never paid. Ellingburg challenged this restitution order as unconstitutional retroactive punishment, arguing the government cannot apply new penalties to old crimes. The case forces the Supreme Court to determine whether victim restitution constitutes criminal punishment protected by the Constitution's ban on ex post facto laws.

Question Presented: Whether restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 constitutes criminal punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Holding: The Supreme Court held that restitution under the MVRA constitutes criminal punishment subject to Ex Post Facto Clause analysis.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kavanaugh wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion joined by Justice Gorsuch.

Majority's Rationale: Congress explicitly labeled MVRA restitution as a "penalty" for criminal offenses imposed during sentencing alongside imprisonment and fines. The statute appears in the criminal code and requires courts to follow criminal procedure rules when ordering restitution. Defendants who refuse to pay face potential imprisonment for punishment and deterrence purposes, confirming the criminal nature.

Concurring Rationale: Justice Thomas argued the Court should abandon its current twelve-factor test for determining criminal punishment. The original 1798 understanding of ex post facto laws protected against any retroactive government penalties for public wrongs. Modern courts should focus on whether laws impose coercive sanctions for offenses against government authority, regardless of civil labels.

Oral Advocates:

1. For Petitioner: Amy M. Saharia, Washington, D.C. argued for petitioner.
2. For Respondent in Support of Vacatur: Ashley Robertson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice argued for respondent in support of vacatur.
3. For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below: John F. Bash, Austin, Texas.

Coney Island Auto Parts, Inc. v. Burton | Date Decided: 1/21/26 | Case No. 24-808

Docket Link: Here

This case involves a time trap tangle examining when void verdicts gain validity. Coney Island's bank account gets frozen for nearly $100,000 based on a 2015 Tennessee judgment they claim they never knew about. When Coney finally fights back seven years later, the Sixth Circuit dismisses the case, saying that you waited too long to challenge the judgment Coney didn’t even know about. If a judgment was invalid from the start, does waiting too long make it become valid?

Question Presented: Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) imposes any time limit to set aside a void default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Holding: Rule 60(c)(1)’s reasonable-time limit applies to a motion alleging that a judgment is void under Rule 60(b)(4).

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion. Justice Sotomayor wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment.

Majority's Rationale: Rule 60(c)(1) clearly requires all Rule 60(b) motions within reasonable time, including void judgment challenges. Even void judgments face timing limits because no constitutional principle grants unlimited challenge time. Allowing indefinite challenges would create extreme consequences like ignoring appeal and certiorari deadlines.

Concurring Rationale: Rule 60's text and structure clearly require reasonable time limits for all motions. The majority unnecessarily addressed constitutional questions that no party raised or argued. Courts should stick to deciding actual disputes, not inventing constitutional theories.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

1. For Petitioner (Coney): Daniel Ginzburg, Freehold, N.J.
2. For Respondent (Burton): Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C.

Berk v. Choy | Date Decided: 1/20/26 | Case No. 24-440

Docket Link: Here

Episode Preview: Here

Overview: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure conflict with state screening requirements raises fundamental questions about procedural uniformity in diversity jurisdiction and limits on state authority over federal court operations.

Question Presented: Whether a state law providing that a complaint must be dismissed unless it is accompanied by an expert affidavit may be applied in federal court.

Holding: Delaware’s affidavit law does not apply in federal court.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett wrote the majority opinion. Justice Jackson wrote an opinion concurring in the result.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

1. For Petitioner: Andrew T. Tutt, Washington, D.C.
2. For Respondent: Frederick R. Yarger, Denver, CO.

Posture: Third Circuit affirmed dismissal; Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed unanimously.

Main Arguments:

1. Berk (Petitioner): (1) Rule 8 requires only "short and plain statement," precluding additional merit requirements; (2) Rule 12 forbids considering materials outside pleadings for dismissal; (3) Federal Rules displace conflicting state procedural laws in diversity cases
2. Defendants (Choy and Beebe): (1) Rule 11 creates statutory exception allowing state affidavit requirements; (2) Delaware law addresses different issue than Federal Rules; (3) State screening mechanisms constitute substantive law under Erie doctrine

Implications: Berk victory establishes federal procedural rule supremacy over conflicting state requirements, protecting diversity jurisdiction access while potentially eliminating state tort reform screening mechanisms in federal court. Defendants victory would enable states to impose additional federal court barriers beyond Federal Rules requirements, potentially creating procedural chaos through conflicting state requirements and undermining uniform federal court procedures nationwide.

The Fine Print:

1. Federal Rule 8(a)(2): "A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief"
2. Delaware Code § 6853(a)(1): "No action for medical negligence shall be filed unless the complaint is accompanied by an affidavit of merit signed by a medical professional"

Primary Cases:

1. Hanna v. Plumer (1965): Valid Federal Rules displace contrary state law even when state law qualifies as substantive under Erie; Federal Rules govern procedure in federal court