Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe I | Case No. 24-856 | Docket Link: Here

Oral Advocates:

• Petitioners (Cisco Systems): Kannon K. Shanmugam of Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP
• Respondents (Doe I, et al.): Paul L. Hoffman of Schonbrun DeSimone Seplow Harris & Hoffman, LLP
• Amicus Curiae (United States): Curtis E. Gannon of the Department of Justice

Question Presented: Whether the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act authorize civil aiding-and-abetting liability against a U.S. technology company for facilitating a foreign government's torture of a religious minority.

Overview: Falun Gong practitioners sued Cisco for building custom surveillance technology the Chinese government used to identify, arrest, and torture them. The case tests whether two federal statutes allow courts to impose civil liability on corporate enablers of foreign atrocity.

Posture: Ninth Circuit reversed dismissal and allowed aiding-and-abetting claims to proceed; Supreme Court granted certiorari January 9, 2026.

Main Arguments:

• Cisco (Petitioner): (1) Federal courts lack authority to create any new ATS causes of action — that power belongs exclusively to Congress; (2) Central Bank forecloses implied civil aiding-and-abetting liability absent express statutory authorization; (3) The TVPA's verb "subjects" covers command responsibility, not remote corporate assistance far removed from custody or control of victims.
• Falun Gong Practitioners (Respondent): (1) Aiding-and-abetting liability existed under the law of nations at the Founding and the First Congress intended ATS coverage to reach accessories; (2) Central Bank applied ordinary statutory interpretation, not a blanket clear-statement rule, and both the ATS and TVPA support aiding-and-abetting claims under that same analysis; (3) The TVPA's deliberate choice of the broad verb "subjects" — rather than the narrower "commits" used in criminal statutes — reflects congressional intent to reach secondary actors, confirmed by legislative history stating liability extends to those who "ordered, abetted, or assisted in the torture."

Implications: A Cisco victory ends this case and signals that American companies face no civil ATS or TVPA exposure for knowingly supplying technology used by foreign governments to commit atrocities — leaving accountability to the political branches alone. A Falun Gong victory exposes U.S. companies and executives to civil liability for their role in foreign human-rights abuses, creating significant legal risk across global supply chains, technology exports, and international business dealings with authoritarian states.

The Fine Print:

• Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."
• Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, § 2(a)(1): "An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation — subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual."

Primary Cases:

• Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (2004): Courts retain limited authority to recognize ATS causes of action for international-law violations meeting a strict two-step test of specificity and judicial discretion, but must proceed with great caution.
• Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. (1994): Civil aiding-and-abetting liability does not exist under a federal statute unless Congress expressly provides for it; statutory silence does not imply it.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:01:31] Oral Advocates

[00:01:52] Argument Begins

[00:01:59] Cisco Opening Statement

[00:04:17] Cisco Free for All Questions

[00:21:49] Cisco Round Robin Questions

[00:38:55] United States Opening Statement

[00:40:05] United States Free for All Questions

[00:50:27] United States Round Robin Questions

[01:19:39] Doe Opening Statement

[01:22:12] Doe Free for All Questions

[01:50:47] Doe Round Robin Questions

[01:55:52] Cisco Rebuttal

Chatrie v. United States | Case No. 25-112 | Docket Link: Here

Oral Advocates:

• Petitioner (Chatrie): Adam G. Unikowsky of Jenner & Block
• Respondent (United States): Eric J. Feigin of the Department of Justice

Question Presented: Whether the execution of a geofence warrant — compelling Google to search the location data of all users to identify devices near a crime scene — violated the Fourth Amendment.

Overview: Police ordered Google to scan hundreds of millions of users' private location records to catch a bank robber, without naming any suspect. The Court now decides whether geofence warrants survive the Fourth Amendment's ban on general searches.

Posture: Fourth Circuit en banc affirmed denial of suppression in a single-sentence per curiam opinion.

Main Arguments:

• Chatrie (Petitioner): (1) Location History data constitutes Chatrie's property, making government access a trespass; (2) The warrant operated as an unconstitutional general warrant by compelling Google to search all users without individualized probable cause; (3) Each warrant step independently failed particularity and probable cause requirements
• Government (Respondent): (1) Chatrie voluntarily opted into Location History, triggering the third-party doctrine and forfeiting any privacy claim in two hours of public movements; (2) Chatrie's property theory was forfeited below and lacks any foundation in American law; (3) The magistrate-issued warrant satisfied probable cause and particularity, and the good-faith exception independently bars suppression

Implications: A Chatrie victory likely ends geofence warrants as currently used — law enforcement would need to identify specific accounts before any search, fundamentally limiting their ability to identify unknown suspects through third-party tech platforms. It could also extend Fourth Amendment property protection to cloud-stored data broadly. A government victory grants constitutional clearance for geofence warrants and reaffirms the third-party doctrine against digital location data, exposing every opted-in user's movements to law enforcement access whenever a crime occurs nearby — including near places of worship, political gatherings, or medical facilities.

The Fine Print:

• Fourth Amendment: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
• 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (Stored Communications Act): Requires a warrant for the government to compel disclosure of the contents of electronic communications stored for 180 days or fewer — a provision Chatrie argues supports a broader Fourth Amendment warrant requirement for location data.

Primary Cases:

• Carpenter v. United States (2018): The Court held that seven or more days of cell-site location information triggers Fourth Amendment protection, declining to apply the third-party doctrine where data reveals the intimate patterns of daily life — Chatrie's central precedent
• Smith v. Maryland (1979): Established the third-party doctrine — a person who voluntarily shares information with a third party "assumes the risk" of disclosure to law enforcement and forfeits Fourth Amendment protection — the government's bedrock authority

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:01:21] Oral Advocates

[00:01:29] Argument Begins

[00:01:37] Chatrie Opening Statement

[00:02:55] Chatrie Free for All Questions

[00:26:57] Chatrie Round Robin Questions

[00:58:35] United States Opening Statement

[01:01:05] United States Free for All Questions

[01:28:53] United States Round Robin Questions

[01:56:42] Chatrie Rebuttal

Monsanto Co. v. Durnell | Case No. 24-1068 | Docket Link: Here

Oral Advocates:

• Petitioner (Monsanto): Paul D. Clement of Clement & Murphy
• Respondent (Durnell): Ashley C. Keller of Keller Postman
• Amicus Curiae (United States): Sarah M. Harris of the Department of Justice

Question Presented: Whether FIFRA preempts a state failure-to-warn claim when EPA approved the pesticide label without requiring a cancer warning.

Overview: John Durnell sprayed Roundup for over two decades before a cancer diagnosis. EPA approved Roundup's label with no cancer warning for fifty years. The Court must decide whether that federal approval shields Monsanto from a $1.25 million Missouri jury verdict.

Posture: Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed jury verdict; Missouri Supreme Court denied transfer; cert granted.

Main Arguments:

• Monsanto (Petitioner): (1) EPA's pesticide-specific registration imposes binding federal labeling requirements that preempt conflicting state tort duties; (2) Missouri's failure-to-warn standard diverges from FIFRA's mandatory cost-benefit analysis; (3) Federal law forbade unilateral label changes, making simultaneous compliance with state and federal law impossible.

• Durnell (Respondent): (1) FIFRA delegates to courts and juries — not EPA — the final word on whether a label violates the misbranding prohibition; (2) Missouri law mirrors FIFRA's misbranding standards and runs parallel, not in conflict; (3) Monsanto could add a cancer warning unilaterally, as Bayer proved in 2012 with a different pesticide.

Implications: A Monsanto victory extinguishes over 100,000 Roundup cancer lawsuits nationwide and establishes that EPA registration conclusively insulates pesticide manufacturers from state tort liability — a rule that extends to every federally registered pesticide. A Durnell victory preserves state-court accountability for pesticide warnings and confirms that juries, not EPA, hold final authority over whether a label misled consumers. Durnell's victory also subjects every pesticide manufacturer to potentially inconsistent verdicts across fifty states, and risks removing critical agricultural chemicals from commerce through cascading liability.

The Fine Print:

• 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b): "Such State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter."
• 7 U.S.C. § 136a(f)(2): "In no event shall registration of an article be construed as a defense for the commission of any offense under this subchapter."

Primary Cases:

• Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC (2005): State failure-to-warn law targeting false or misleading pesticide labels survives FIFRA preemption when it mirrors the federal misbranding standard; preemption applies only where state requirements actually differ from federal requirements.
• PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing (2011): Impossibility preemption bars state failure-to-warn claims when federal law prevents manufacturers from independently making the label change state law requires.

Timestamps:

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