Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe I | Case No. 24-856 | Docket Link: Here

Oral Advocates:

• Petitioners (Cisco Systems): Kannon K. Shanmugam of Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP
• Respondents (Doe I, et al.): Paul L. Hoffman of Schonbrun DeSimone Seplow Harris & Hoffman, LLP
• Amicus Curiae (United States): Curtis E. Gannon of the Department of Justice

Question Presented: Whether the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act authorize civil aiding-and-abetting liability against a U.S. technology company for facilitating a foreign government's torture of a religious minority.

Overview: Falun Gong practitioners sued Cisco for building custom surveillance technology the Chinese government used to identify, arrest, and torture them. The case tests whether two federal statutes allow courts to impose civil liability on corporate enablers of foreign atrocity.

Posture: Ninth Circuit reversed dismissal and allowed aiding-and-abetting claims to proceed; Supreme Court granted certiorari January 9, 2026.

Main Arguments:

• Cisco (Petitioner): (1) Federal courts lack authority to create any new ATS causes of action — that power belongs exclusively to Congress; (2) Central Bank forecloses implied civil aiding-and-abetting liability absent express statutory authorization; (3) The TVPA's verb "subjects" covers command responsibility, not remote corporate assistance far removed from custody or control of victims.
• Falun Gong Practitioners (Respondent): (1) Aiding-and-abetting liability existed under the law of nations at the Founding and the First Congress intended ATS coverage to reach accessories; (2) Central Bank applied ordinary statutory interpretation, not a blanket clear-statement rule, and both the ATS and TVPA support aiding-and-abetting claims under that same analysis; (3) The TVPA's deliberate choice of the broad verb "subjects" — rather than the narrower "commits" used in criminal statutes — reflects congressional intent to reach secondary actors, confirmed by legislative history stating liability extends to those who "ordered, abetted, or assisted in the torture."

Implications: A Cisco victory ends this case and signals that American companies face no civil ATS or TVPA exposure for knowingly supplying technology used by foreign governments to commit atrocities — leaving accountability to the political branches alone. A Falun Gong victory exposes U.S. companies and executives to civil liability for their role in foreign human-rights abuses, creating significant legal risk across global supply chains, technology exports, and international business dealings with authoritarian states.

The Fine Print:

• Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."
• Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, § 2(a)(1): "An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation — subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual."

Primary Cases:

• Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (2004): Courts retain limited authority to recognize ATS causes of action for international-law violations meeting a strict two-step test of specificity and judicial discretion, but must proceed with great caution.
• Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. (1994): Civil aiding-and-abetting liability does not exist under a federal statute unless Congress expressly provides for it; statutory silence does not imply it.

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:01:31] Oral Advocates

[00:01:52] Argument Begins

[00:01:59] Cisco Opening Statement

[00:04:17] Cisco Free for All Questions

[00:21:49] Cisco Round Robin Questions

[00:38:55] United States Opening Statement

[00:40:05] United States Free for All Questions

[00:50:27] United States Round Robin Questions

[01:19:39] Doe Opening Statement

[01:22:12] Doe Free for All Questions

[01:50:47] Doe Round Robin Questions

[01:55:52] Cisco Rebuttal

Chatrie v. United States | Case No. 25-112 | Docket Link: Here

Oral Advocates:

• Petitioner (Chatrie): Adam G. Unikowsky of Jenner & Block
• Respondent (United States): Eric J. Feigin of the Department of Justice

Question Presented: Whether the execution of a geofence warrant — compelling Google to search the location data of all users to identify devices near a crime scene — violated the Fourth Amendment.

Overview: Police ordered Google to scan hundreds of millions of users' private location records to catch a bank robber, without naming any suspect. The Court now decides whether geofence warrants survive the Fourth Amendment's ban on general searches.

Posture: Fourth Circuit en banc affirmed denial of suppression in a single-sentence per curiam opinion.

Main Arguments:

• Chatrie (Petitioner): (1) Location History data constitutes Chatrie's property, making government access a trespass; (2) The warrant operated as an unconstitutional general warrant by compelling Google to search all users without individualized probable cause; (3) Each warrant step independently failed particularity and probable cause requirements
• Government (Respondent): (1) Chatrie voluntarily opted into Location History, triggering the third-party doctrine and forfeiting any privacy claim in two hours of public movements; (2) Chatrie's property theory was forfeited below and lacks any foundation in American law; (3) The magistrate-issued warrant satisfied probable cause and particularity, and the good-faith exception independently bars suppression

Implications: A Chatrie victory likely ends geofence warrants as currently used — law enforcement would need to identify specific accounts before any search, fundamentally limiting their ability to identify unknown suspects through third-party tech platforms. It could also extend Fourth Amendment property protection to cloud-stored data broadly. A government victory grants constitutional clearance for geofence warrants and reaffirms the third-party doctrine against digital location data, exposing every opted-in user's movements to law enforcement access whenever a crime occurs nearby — including near places of worship, political gatherings, or medical facilities.

The Fine Print:

• Fourth Amendment: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
• 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (Stored Communications Act): Requires a warrant for the government to compel disclosure of the contents of electronic communications stored for 180 days or fewer — a provision Chatrie argues supports a broader Fourth Amendment warrant requirement for location data.

Primary Cases:

• Carpenter v. United States (2018): The Court held that seven or more days of cell-site location information triggers Fourth Amendment protection, declining to apply the third-party doctrine where data reveals the intimate patterns of daily life — Chatrie's central precedent
• Smith v. Maryland (1979): Established the third-party doctrine — a person who voluntarily shares information with a third party "assumes the risk" of disclosure to law enforcement and forfeits Fourth Amendment protection — the government's bedrock authority

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:01:21] Oral Advocates

[00:01:29] Argument Begins

[00:01:37] Chatrie Opening Statement

[00:02:55] Chatrie Free for All Questions

[00:26:57] Chatrie Round Robin Questions

[00:58:35] United States Opening Statement

[01:01:05] United States Free for All Questions

[01:28:53] United States Round Robin Questions

[01:56:42] Chatrie Rebuttal

Monsanto Co. v. Durnell | Case No. 24-1068 | Docket Link: Here

Oral Advocates:

• Petitioner (Monsanto): Paul D. Clement of Clement & Murphy
• Respondent (Durnell): Ashley C. Keller of Keller Postman
• Amicus Curiae (United States): Sarah M. Harris of the Department of Justice

Question Presented: Whether FIFRA preempts a state failure-to-warn claim when EPA approved the pesticide label without requiring a cancer warning.

Overview: John Durnell sprayed Roundup for over two decades before a cancer diagnosis. EPA approved Roundup's label with no cancer warning for fifty years. The Court must decide whether that federal approval shields Monsanto from a $1.25 million Missouri jury verdict.

Posture: Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed jury verdict; Missouri Supreme Court denied transfer; cert granted.

Main Arguments:

• Monsanto (Petitioner): (1) EPA's pesticide-specific registration imposes binding federal labeling requirements that preempt conflicting state tort duties; (2) Missouri's failure-to-warn standard diverges from FIFRA's mandatory cost-benefit analysis; (3) Federal law forbade unilateral label changes, making simultaneous compliance with state and federal law impossible.

• Durnell (Respondent): (1) FIFRA delegates to courts and juries — not EPA — the final word on whether a label violates the misbranding prohibition; (2) Missouri law mirrors FIFRA's misbranding standards and runs parallel, not in conflict; (3) Monsanto could add a cancer warning unilaterally, as Bayer proved in 2012 with a different pesticide.

Implications: A Monsanto victory extinguishes over 100,000 Roundup cancer lawsuits nationwide and establishes that EPA registration conclusively insulates pesticide manufacturers from state tort liability — a rule that extends to every federally registered pesticide. A Durnell victory preserves state-court accountability for pesticide warnings and confirms that juries, not EPA, hold final authority over whether a label misled consumers. Durnell's victory also subjects every pesticide manufacturer to potentially inconsistent verdicts across fifty states, and risks removing critical agricultural chemicals from commerce through cascading liability.

The Fine Print:

• 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b): "Such State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter."
• 7 U.S.C. § 136a(f)(2): "In no event shall registration of an article be construed as a defense for the commission of any offense under this subchapter."

Primary Cases:

• Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC (2005): State failure-to-warn law targeting false or misleading pesticide labels survives FIFRA preemption when it mirrors the federal misbranding standard; preemption applies only where state requirements actually differ from federal requirements.
• PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing (2011): Impossibility preemption bars state failure-to-warn claims when federal law prevents manufacturers from independently making the label change state law requires.

Timestamps:

[Sorry, come back later for timestamps!]

Enbridge Energy v. Nessel | Oral Argument: 2/24/2026 | Case No. 24-783 | Docket Link: Here | Decided: 4/22/26

Overview: Pipeline company removes Michigan environmental lawsuit to federal court two years late, claiming extraordinary circumstances involving international treaty and state forum manipulation justify extending statutory deadline.

Question Presented: Can federal may extend the 30-day removal deadline under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) for extraordinary circumstances.

Posture: District court allowed late removal; Sixth Circuit reversed and ordered remand to state court.

Holding: Because 28 U. S. C. §1446(b)(1)’s text, structure, and context are inconsistent with equitable tolling, Enbridge’s removal of the case to federal court outside the statute’s 30-day deadline was untimely.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor authored the unanimous opinion. No Justice authored a separate opinion.

Result: Affirmed. Nessel wins.

Opinion: Here

Majority Reasoning: (1) Statutory exceptions throughout removal law demonstrate Congress rejected general equitable tolling; (2) Mandatory language requires strict deadline enforcement; (3) Efficiency concerns counsel against case-by-case deadline extensions through judicial discretion.

Implications: Companies lose flexibility to move cases to federal court after missing statutory deadlines. State courts retain jurisdiction over environmental and regulatory disputes even when federal issues arise later. Forum selection becomes permanent within thirty days of service regardless of extraordinary circumstances.

Main Arguments:

• Enbridge (Petitioner): (1) Equitable tolling presumption applies to all non-jurisdictional filing deadlines; (2) Congressional exceptions elsewhere don't preclude judicial flexibility here; (3) International treaty invocation and state forum manipulation create extraordinary circumstances

• Nessel (Respondent): (1) Removal deadlines govern forum selection, not claim staleness; (2) Six express statutory exceptions rebut tolling presumption; (3) Strategic litigation choices don't constitute extraordinary circumstances

The Fine Print:

• 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1): "The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading"

• 1977 U.S.-Canada Transit Pipelines Treaty, Article II(1): "Each Party shall ensure that no public authority in its jurisdiction implements any measure that would have the effect of impeding, redirecting, redirecting or interfering with in any way the transmission of hydrocarbons in transit"

Primary Cases:

• United States v. Brockamp (1997): Explicit statutory exceptions strongly indicate Congress rejected additional implied exceptions through judicial interpretation

• Young v. United States (2002): Equitable tolling applies to statutory deadlines that "prescribe a period within which certain rights may be enforced" unless Congress clearly indicates otherwise

• Arellano v. McDonough (2023): Detailed statutory exceptions within same provision rebut equitable tolling presumption; courts cannot add implied exceptions where Congress specified express ones

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioners (Petitioners Enbridge Energy): John Bursch of Bursch Law PLLC.
• For Respondent (Nessel): Ann Sherman, Michigan's Solicitor General.

Enbridge Energy v. Nessel | Oral Argument: 2/24/2026 | Case No. 24-783 | Docket Link: Here | Decided: 4/22/26

Overview: Pipeline company removes Michigan environmental lawsuit to federal court two years late, claiming extraordinary circumstances involving international treaty and state forum manipulation justify extending statutory deadline.

Question Presented: Can federal may extend the 30-day removal deadline under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) for extraordinary circumstances.

Posture: District court allowed late removal; Sixth Circuit reversed and ordered remand to state court.

Holding: Because 28 U. S. C. §1446(b)(1)’s text, structure, and context are inconsistent with equitable tolling, Enbridge’s removal of the case to federal court outside the statute’s 30-day deadline was untimely.

Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor authored the unanimous opinion. No Justice authored a separate opinion.

Result: Affirmed. Nessel wins.

Opinion: Here

Majority Reasoning: (1) Statutory exceptions throughout removal law demonstrate Congress rejected general equitable tolling; (2) Mandatory language requires strict deadline enforcement; (3) Efficiency concerns counsel against case-by-case deadline extensions through judicial discretion.

Implications: Companies lose flexibility to move cases to federal court after missing statutory deadlines. State courts retain jurisdiction over environmental and regulatory disputes even when federal issues arise later. Forum selection becomes permanent within thirty days of service regardless of extraordinary circumstances.

Main Arguments:

• Enbridge (Petitioner): (1) Equitable tolling presumption applies to all non-jurisdictional filing deadlines; (2) Congressional exceptions elsewhere don't preclude judicial flexibility here; (3) International treaty invocation and state forum manipulation create extraordinary circumstances

• Nessel (Respondent): (1) Removal deadlines govern forum selection, not claim staleness; (2) Six express statutory exceptions rebut tolling presumption; (3) Strategic litigation choices don't constitute extraordinary circumstances

The Fine Print:

• 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1): "The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading"

• 1977 U.S.-Canada Transit Pipelines Treaty, Article II(1): "Each Party shall ensure that no public authority in its jurisdiction implements any measure that would have the effect of impeding, redirecting, redirecting or interfering with in any way the transmission of hydrocarbons in transit"

Primary Cases:

• United States v. Brockamp (1997): Explicit statutory exceptions strongly indicate Congress rejected additional implied exceptions through judicial interpretation

• Young v. United States (2002): Equitable tolling applies to statutory deadlines that "prescribe a period within which certain rights may be enforced" unless Congress clearly indicates otherwise

• Arellano v. McDonough (2023): Detailed statutory exceptions within same provision rebut equitable tolling presumption; courts cannot add implied exceptions where Congress specified express ones

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioners (Petitioners Enbridge Energy): John Bursch of Bursch Law PLLC.
• For Respondent (Nessel): Ann Sherman, Michigan's Solicitor General.

Mullin v. Doe | 25-1083 | Docket Link: Here

Consolidated with Trump v. Miot 25-1084 | Docket Link: Here

Argument Date: 4/29/2026

Question Presented: Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A)'s judicial review bar precludes APA challenges to the Secretary's termination of Syria's Temporary Protected Status designation, and if reviewable, whether the termination violated the APA.

Overview: Emergency stay application challenges Secretary Mullin's termination of Temporary Protected Status for 6,132 Syrian nationals. Central questions: whether courts may review TPS termination decisions at all, and whether the Secretary followed required consultation and country-conditions procedures.

Posture: S.D.N.Y. postponed Syria's TPS termination; Second Circuit denied stay; government now seeks Supreme Court intervention.

Main Arguments:

• Government (Applicant): (1) Section 1254a(b)(5)(A) bars all APA challenges to TPS terminations; (2) Secretary validly consulted agencies and invoked national interest; (3) Courts cannot brand a new administration's policy priorities as pretext
• Syrian TPS Holders (Respondents): (1) Judicial review bar covers country-conditions determinations only, not procedural violations; (2) Secretary never genuinely consulted agencies and invoked an extra-statutory factor; (3) Concrete harms to 6,132 Syrians facing deportation to an active war zone favor denial

Implications:

(A) Government victory:

• The judicial review bar broadly strips courts of authority to review all TPS termination decisions
• Clear path for DHS Secretary to implement terminations across all thirteen countries — potentially stripping hundreds of thousands of TPS holders of legal status with no judicial recourse.
• TPS becomes a pure presidential foreign-policy tool.

(B) TPS holders victory:

• Courts retain authority to enforce TPS's procedural requirements;
• The Secretary must genuinely consult agencies and review actual country conditions;
• 6,132 Syrians retain lawful status while the Second Circuit completes full appellate review.

The Fine Print:

• 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A): "There is no judicial review of any determination of the [Secretary] with respect to the designation, or termination or extension of a designation, of a foreign state under this subsection."
• 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(3)(A): "[A]fter consultation with appropriate agencies of the Government," the Secretary "shall review the conditions in the foreign state . . . and shall determine whether the conditions for such designation . . . continue to be met."

Primary Cases:

• McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. (1991): A comparable immigration statute's reference to "a determination" described a single act — the denial of an individual application — and did not bar general collateral challenges to unconstitutional agency practices and policies; the central precedent for the TPS holders' jurisdictional argument.
• Noem v. NTPSA, 145 S. Ct. 2728 (2025) (NTPSA I) & 146 S. Ct. 23 (2025) (NTPSA II): Supreme Court stayed two district court orders blocking Venezuela's TPS termination without written explanation; the government argues these orders "inform" the equitable analysis here and reflect prior acceptance of its likelihood-of-success argument.

Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish | Case No. 24-813 | Decided: April 17, 2026 | Docket Link: Here

Question Presented: Whether a state environmental lawsuit challenging a WWII military contractor's crude oil production "relates to" its federal avgas refining contract under the federal officer removal statute.

Overview: Louisiana parishes sued Chevron over World War II oil production damage. Chevron invoked the federal officer removal statute, arguing its wartime crude oil production closely related to its military contract to refine aviation gasoline for the U.S. military.

Posture: District Court and Fifth Circuit both denied removal; Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Holding: Chevron plausibly alleged a close relationship between its challenged crude-oil production and the performance of its federal aviation gas refining duties and therefore satisfied the “relating to” requirement of the federal officer removal statute.

Voting Breakdown: 8-0. Justice Thomas authored the majority, joined by six Justices. Justice Jackson authored an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito did not participate in the case.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Majority Reasoning: (1) "Relating to" under the federal officer removal statute requires a close — not tenuous, remote, or peripheral — connection between challenged conduct and federal duties; no explicit contractual directive needed; (2) Chevron's crude oil production closely related to its federal avgas refining — wartime drilling practices directly enabled military fuel output; (3) The P.A.W.'s role allocating crude oil among refineries as an intermediary did not sever the production-refining relationship.

Separate Opinions:

• Justice Jackson (concurring in judgment): Agreed Chevron satisfies the removal requirements but argued the 2011 "or relating to" amendment preserved the prior causal-nexus test rather than replacing it with a looser indirect-relationship standard; Chevron satisfies both tests.

Implications: Military contractors and other companies that performed federal government work during wartime now carry stronger arguments to move state environmental and other lawsuits into federal court. The ruling clarifies that a close relationship between challenged conduct and federal duties suffices — no explicit contractual directive required. Jackson's concurrence signals future courts may apply a stricter causal-nexus test when facts run thinner. Louisiana parishes pursuing decades-old coastal damage claims against other wartime oil companies face the same federal-forum question across 41 remaining lawsuits.

The Fine Print:

• 28 U.S.C. §1442(a)(1): "[A] civil action or criminal prosecution that is commenced in a State court and that is against or directed to . . . [t]he United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof . . . for or relating to any act under color of such office."
• Louisiana Coastal Resources Management Act, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §49:214.34(C)(2): "Individual specific uses legally commenced or established prior to the effective date of the coastal use permit program."

Primary Cases:

• Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (1992): "Relating to" encompasses indirect connections; state advertising rules related to airline rates even where consumer decisions intervened as intermediaries in the causal chain.
• Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon (1990): A law "relates to" something even when lawmakers never specifically designed it to affect that subject; explicit direction unnecessary to establish a cognizable relationship.

Bondi v. Lau (formerly named Bondi v. Lau) | Case No. 25-429 | Docket Link: Here

Oral Advocates:

• Petitioner (United States): Sopan Joshi of the Department of Justice
• Respondent (Muk Choi Lau): Shay Dvoretzky of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP

Question Presented: Whether the government, to remove a lawful permanent resident as inadmissible after paroling him into the United States, must prove it possessed clear and convincing evidence of the disqualifying offense at the time of reentry.

Overview: A green-card holder returns from a brief trip abroad facing only unproven criminal charges. The government paroles him in, waits for his conviction, then invokes the inadmissibility track. The Supreme Court now decides whether that sequence respects the INA's plain text.

Posture: Second Circuit vacated removal order; Supreme Court granted certiorari January 9, 2026.

Main Arguments:

• Government (Petitioner): (1) Courts lack jurisdiction to review discretionary parole decisions; (2) The INA requires proof of the offense at the removal hearing, not at the border; (3) Requiring border officers to weigh clear-and-convincing evidence before paroling LPRs would nullify decades of lawful practice
• Lau (Respondent): (1) The INA's plain text requires the government to establish the statutory exception at the time of reentry; (2) Courts retain jurisdiction to review whether DHS held authority to parole at all; (3) The government retains ample deportation authority under § 1227 and faces no operational hardship

Implications (90 words max): A government victory preserves DHS's ability to parole returning green-card holders facing criminal charges, use later convictions to justify the parole decision, and invoke the inadmissibility track — where the noncitizen bears the burden of proof. A Lau victory forces the government onto the deportation track for any LPR admitted without sufficient border-time evidence, shifting the burden of proof to the government. Millions of permanent residents who travel abroad while facing pending charges would gain a clearer procedural protection against the inadmissibility framework.

The Fine Print:

• 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C): "An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States shall not be regarded as seeking an admission into the United States for purposes of the immigration laws unless the alien — … (v) has committed an offense identified in section 1182(a)(2) of this title…"
• 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A): "The Secretary of Homeland Security may … in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily … only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any alien applying for admission to the United States, but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien…"

Primary Cases:

• Wilkinson v. Garland (2024): Courts retain jurisdiction to review whether a noncitizen met the statutory eligibility requirements for a discretionary immigration decision — even where the ultimate exercise of discretion sits beyond judicial review
• Vartelas v. Holder (2012): A lawful permanent resident who committed a crime involving moral turpitude before a 1996 statutory change could not retroactively lose the right to travel abroad and return; the Court acknowledged in dicta that § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) appears to require conviction or admission of the offense

Timestamps:

[00:00:00] Argument Preview

[00:01:22] Oral Advocates

[00:01:33] Argument Begins

[00:01:38] United States Opening Statement

[00:03:42] United States Free for All Questions

[00:26:57] United States Round Robin Questions

[00:51:52] Lau Opening Statement

[00:54:15] Lau Free for All Questions

[01:22:24] Lau Round Robin Questions

[01:25:46] United States Rebuttal