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The Security Table

The Security Table

Written by: Izar Tarandach Matt Coles and Chris Romeo
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The Security Table is four cybersecurity industry veterans from diverse backgrounds discussing how to build secure software and all the issues that arise!

© 2026 The Security Table
Episodes
  • Claude Code Said ‘Don’t Ask Again.’ Then It Leaked Your Secrets to GitHub
    Nov 18 2026

    Click “Yes, and don’t ask again” in Claude Code and it saves the exact command you approved, password and all, into a local settings file that keeps turning up in public GitHub repos. We start by admitting we all run auto mode, then argue over who is actually at fault: Izar says the harness should recognize a credential when it asks for one, Matt wants to know why a secret ever lands in a plain text file, and Chris can’t figure out how a model that happily explains key rotation never noticed it was leaking keys. From there we hit SSHole, an OpenSSH authentication bypass with its own logo and domain that almost nobody heard about, and the OpenCode Console breach, where one hosted service holding everyone’s provider keys became one very expensive basket. We wrap with OpenAI’s Daybreak, whether AI belongs in forensics, and Izar’s remarkably generous grading policy. Also on the menu: a birthday song for Matt, a vegan restaurant, and billboards only San Francisco could love. Rotate your keys.

    Mentioned in this Episode:
    ➜ Claude Code’s ‘don’t ask again’ button has a secrets-spilling problem
    ➜ OpenSSH flaw lets attackers log into password-disabled Linux accounts
    ➜ OpenCode hack exposes API keys amid AI distillation attacks
    ➜ OpenCode Console Breach: Concentrated Provider Keys at Risk
    ➜ OpenAI Daybreak

    Chapters:
    00:00:00 - Cold Open: Happy Birthday, Matt
    00:00:42 - Izar's Pandemic Harmonica
    00:02:03 - AI Billboards in San Francisco
    00:03:05 - The "Sorry We Leaked Your Code" Billboard
    00:03:45 - OWASP San Francisco Recap
    00:04:28 - Movie Night in Izar's Hotel Room
    00:05:59 - Should OWASP Host a Movie Night?
    00:06:27 - Comic Con Needs a Cybersecurity Panel
    00:07:07 - The Vegan Restaurant Experience
    00:08:56 - Wild Seed and Mac and Not Cheese
    00:10:03 - Article Intro: Claude Code's Don't Ask Again Leak
    00:10:20 - Confessions of Auto Mode Users
    00:11:42 - How the Secrets End Up on GitHub
    00:12:47 - AI Memory: Everything Goes Everywhere
    00:14:02 - Why Didn't the AI Catch It?
    00:15:43 - Model Problem or Harness Problem?
    00:16:44 - Harnesses That Get It Right
    00:17:11 - The Real Fix: Rotate Everything
    00:17:59 - AI Compatible Password Vaults
    00:19:04 - Domain Name Detour
    00:20:18 - Article Intro: SSHole, the SSH Flaw Nobody Heard About
    00:22:22 - SHA 256 Password Hashes in 2026?
    00:22:52 - Security Theater and Podcast IMDB Pages
    00:24:07 - Article Intro: OpenCode Console Breach
    00:24:30 - Kalshi, Vegan Beer, and Croutons
    00:25:46 - One Console to Rule Them All
    00:27:00 - Threat Modeling a Key Vault
    00:28:06 - A Better Design for Stored Keys
    00:29:49 - Unpacking the Distillation Attack
    00:33:17 - Key Takeaways: 1.4% of Console Users
    00:35:15 - Daybreak and AI for Forensics
    00:37:17 - Izar the Forensics Professor
    00:38:53 - EnCase and Chain of Custody
    00:39:43 - Closing: Everybody Gets an A
    00:41:44 - Outro

    Follow AI Security Table:

    ➜ Home: https://securitytable.ai/

    ➜ X: https://x.com/SecTablePodcast

    ➜ LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/ai-security-table/

    ➜ YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@AISecurityTable

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    42 mins
  • Stop Patching Bugs, Just Rewrite It… Says the Guy Selling the Tokens
    Nov 11 2026

    Cisco's president handed a 27 year old engineer unlimited AI tokens and 24 months to rewrite 98 percent of the company's legacy code, and Sam Altman now says we can no longer just patch all the bugs. Chris sees a step toward disposable software, where you regenerate the thing instead of fixing it. Matt calls it the holy grail of automation and traces the dream back through UML, code generators and no code tools. Izar wants to know why anyone would bother, and points out that the loudest voice for rewriting everything is the guy selling the tokens. Then it is Hirundo's finding that Qwen3 Coder writes more hackable code when told the app is for a US defense contractor, ProjectDiscovery's backdoored abliterated model, and whether open weight models can be trusted at all. Izar's answer: start with a concrete use case, then verify, verify, verify. Plus: Izar admits he doesn't have enough of a life to need an AI agent.

    Mentioned in this Episode:
    ➜ Cisco is letting a 27-year-old refactor 98% of its legacy code with unlimited AI tokens: 'Go nuts'
    ➜ Sam Altman: 'I No Longer Think We're Gonna Be Able to Just Patch All the Bugs'
    ➜ Bias in Qwen3-Coder Model
    ➜ How abliterated models can get you pwned

    Chapters:
    00:00:00 - Cold Open: A Day Ending in Y
    00:01:36 - The Lost Art of Letter Writing
    00:03:03 - Izar's Agent Identity Threat Model
    00:04:01 - Hiring an Assistant to Run Their Own Life
    00:05:42 - AI Natives Build Apps Nobody Needs
    00:06:13 - The Unskilled Linux Tinkerers
    00:07:26 - Article Intro: Cisco's Unlimited Token Rewrite
    00:09:27 - Publicity Stunt, or Time to Call Aruba?
    00:09:53 - Can One Gen Zer Rewrite Everything?
    00:11:31 - Matt's Case: Measure the Cost of the Rewrite
    00:12:27 - Izar's Rebuttal: Why Would You Do This?
    00:13:18 - Izar Automates the PyTM Release
    00:14:38 - Disposable Software: Regenerate, Don't Fix
    00:16:08 - Article Intro: Altman Says Stop Patching
    00:17:04 - Says the Guy Selling the Tokens
    00:18:20 - From UML to Code Generators
    00:20:13 - From No Code to Natural Language
    00:21:02 - Can AI Clone a Binary?
    00:21:50 - Claude Won't Clone Your Game
    00:22:30 - Frontier Labs Are Cybersecurity Companies Now
    00:24:56 - Why Wasn't Security Already in the Toolchain?
    00:25:46 - AI Is the New Developer
    00:27:38 - Three Conversations at Once
    00:29:16 - Article Intro: Bias in the Qwen3 Coder Model
    00:30:51 - How Does a Model Phone Home?
    00:33:33 - Abliterated Models and Hidden Backdoors
    00:35:43 - Treat AI Like We Should Treat Humans
    00:39:41 - Should You Trust Open Weight Models?
    00:40:24 - Scenario: A Homegrown Biased Model
    00:41:37 - Izar: Start With the Use Case
    00:43:20 - Can Tests Find a Covert Channel?
    00:45:01 - Back to Cisco: Covert Channels in Your Network
    00:46:08 - You Can't Put an Agent in Jail
    00:46:50 - Who's Liable: User or Model Creator?
    00:49:16 - Outro

    Follow AI Security Table:

    ➜ Home: https://securitytable.ai/

    ➜ X: https://x.com/SecTablePodcast

    ➜ LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/ai-security-table/

    ➜ YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@AISecurityTable

    Show More Show Less
    50 mins
  • You Don't Trust AI. So Why Are You Shipping Its Code?
    Nov 4 2026

    Sam Altman told a Stanford audience he no longer thinks we can just patch all the bugs, and the AI Security Table can't agree on whether that is news. Chris argues a swarm of subagents can tear through a repo and drive defects way down, while Matt counters that every system ships with defects and always will, so the real limit is cost, now measured in tokens. Izar warns that tokens are just the new regex, the latest silver bullet in a long line of them. Then the hosts dig into Anthropic's work using Claude to write Rocq proofs for 123 open source libraries, and argue over what a proof actually guarantees, who checks a model that writes both the patch and the proof, and whether compounded mistrust ever adds up to trust. Izar gets the last word: LLMs are not compilers, so stop treating them like one.

    Mentioned in this Episode:
    ➜ Sam Altman: 'I No Longer Think We're Gonna Be Able to Just Patch All the Bugs'
    ➜ LLMs are making formal software verification feasible at a much larger scale
    ➜ seL4
    ➜ The Rocq Prover
    ➜ OSS-Fuzz

    Chapters:
    00:00:00 - Cold Open: Privacy Thought of the Day
    00:01:35 - Article Intro: Altman Can't Patch All the Bugs
    00:02:22 - Izar Reads the Altman Quote
    00:03:07 - How Many Bugs Are in Your Software?
    00:04:07 - Chris's Case: 200 Subagents on One Repo
    00:05:49 - Matt's Case: We Always Ship With Defects
    00:06:54 - The Disposable Software Argument
    00:08:15 - Nobody Saw the Exponential
    00:10:12 - The Token Cost of Hidden Criticals
    00:11:55 - Izar's Rebuttal: Tokens Are the New Regex
    00:13:33 - Defenders Finally Have an Advantage
    00:15:16 - The Knowledge Pyramid
    00:16:57 - We Only Talk About Superintelligence
    00:18:16 - Article Intro: AI and Formal Verification
    00:19:53 - Izar: Proofs Nobody Can Read
    00:20:50 - Matt: Start With Something Small
    00:22:01 - The Proof Gets Bigger Than the Code
    00:25:12 - Correctness Is Not Security
    00:26:53 - Verified Blocks, Untrusted Integration
    00:27:57 - Verifying the seL4 Microkernel
    00:29:02 - What Was Actually Verified?
    00:30:47 - Fuzzing and the Next Byte
    00:31:56 - The Article's Limitations
    00:33:25 - Who Is Actually Doing the Proving?
    00:34:19 - 123 Libraries and 600,000 Line Proofs
    00:35:57 - How Is My Morning Any Better?
    00:36:42 - Memory Safe Languages Already Exist
    00:37:43 - Should Claude Write Its Own Proofs?
    00:39:04 - One Frontier Model Checks Another
    00:39:52 - Does Compounded Mistrust Equal Trust?
    00:41:24 - Use AI With Enough Mistrust
    00:42:17 - How Much AI Code Did You Review?
    00:44:07 - Back to Threat Modeling
    00:44:37 - Feeding Knowledge Back to Agents
    00:46:25 - Secure Coding Standards Never Worked
    00:48:11 - Closing Statements: LLMs Are Not Compilers
    00:48:40 - Outro

    Follow AI Security Table:

    ➜ Home: https://securitytable.ai/

    ➜ X: https://x.com/SecTablePodcast

    ➜ LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/ai-security-table/

    ➜ YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@AISecurityTable

    Show More Show Less
    50 mins
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