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Wavell Room Audio Reads

Wavell Room Audio Reads

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 An improved audio format version of our written content. Get your defence and security perspectives now through this podcast. Political Science Politics & Government
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  • The Future of War – When States No Longer Own The Means of War

    The Future of War – When States No Longer Own The Means of War
    Jan 21 2026
    'Power, violence and legitimacy are fragmenting, and modern conflict is starting to behave accordingly'1
    Introduction
    It's hard to shake the feeling that conflict no longer behaves the way we expect it to. Wars don't end cleanly, responsibility is always blurred, and decisions with real consequences seem to be made everywhere and nowhere at once. We sense that something has changed, but rarely have the space to stop and ask why. This isn't an attempt to predict the next war or sound the alarm. It's an effort to make sense of why power, violence and accountability no longer behave the way we assume they do, and what that could mean for states and societies that still expect to manage them.
    Modern conflict is no longer defined by the Western conception of war as a discrete event led by states, fought by armies, and concluded by treaties. It has become a fluid spectrum shaped by states, private actors, technologies, algorithms, and societies that no longer share a common centre of gravity. The result is a geopolitical environment where the means of violence are distributed, authority is conditional, and conflict increasingly persists rather than resolves. That shift is hard to miss for anyone paying even casual attention to current events.
    Conflict Without Resolution
    In Ukraine, the fallout from Andriy Yermak's resignation in November 2025 was not just another political headline. It exposed a quieter competition over who shapes the end of the war, who decides the terms of security, and which interests gain access and influence when the war eventually winds down. It is a reminder that power has never been centralised in one place, and that competing interests are now shaping outcomes more openly than before. States still matter, but they no longer control the direction of conflict or the timing of peace alone. It shows how even in a major interstate war, control over outcomes is dispersed across political factions, private funders, foreign backers and societal forces.
    Power Beyond the State
    In Venezuela, tensions following the American strike has little to do with drugs, rhetoric or posturing alone. Politics matters, but so do the stakes beneath it: the largest proven oil reserves on earth, critical minerals and control of commercial advantage in a region where global competitors are increasingly active. This is the type of dispute where state power, private interests and informal networks blend into one another, and where none of these actors operate in isolation or according to national logic. It is a textbook case of a conflict shaped more by markets, resources and informal networks than by state intention.
    In the Middle East, Israel's simultaneous operations across Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and the West Bank show how modern warfare behaves when too many actors hold the capacity to escalate. Fronts no longer open and close; they bleed into one another, influenced not only by governments but by proxies, foreign backers and interests that do not wear national uniforms. The result is not confusion, it is complexity. Together, these overlapping fronts reinforce a world in which the power to escalate is no longer held by states alone.
    The Fracturing of Monopoly, Not the State
    These conflicts should not be lumped together, but they reveal a structural reality that they now share: the state is still powerful, but it is no longer the only force that matters. Too many actors now possess the means to shape violence, stall peace or influence outcomes from outside the traditional architecture of a government. The modern battlefield has matured into something closer to a marketplace of capabilities, incentives and interests than a domain controlled solely by states.
    Western strategic thinking has long struggled with this shift because its definitions of war remain narrow. Other traditions have always recognised a wider spectrum: the Russian military and strategic literature use the words borba ('struggle') to capture political, informational ...
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    20 mins
  • Ukraine's Brigade level Commercial Approach

    Ukraine's Brigade level Commercial Approach
    Jan 9 2026
    The Russo-Ukrainian War is a crucible of modern military innovation and has seen adaptation at
    every echelon, which the British Army is seeking to learn lessons from. In particular, the
    emergence of brigade-level commercial contracting within the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) has
    captured the imagination of its commanders. However, such an approach has inherent
    opportunities, risks and consequences. Ultimately, a Ukrainian brigade is not analogous to a British
    one and the Army has higher echelons of capable Division and Corps headquarters. Through a
    blended approach, these can serve to manage a system of 'decentralised' commerical contracting
    whilst mitigating the risks of tactical and institutional fragmentation. The British Army has to be
    discerning in which lessons it chooses to learn and adapt from.
    Over the course of Russo-Ukrainian War, beginning with the seizure of Crimea in 2014 and
    through the full-scale invasion in 2022, the AFU has "radically pivoted its approach to military
    innovation" and evolved a dual-track scheme to develop and procure military technologies. On the
    one hand, it operates a 'centralised' system orchestrated by the Ukrainian government and AFU
    command headquarters. This principally coordinates the flow of western-supplied equipment and
    seeks to manage sovereign industrial output. On the other, a 'decentralised' system has evolved
    with individual AFU brigades working directly with the commercial sector. By this latter approach,
    technology and equipment moves from factory to frontline at ever increasing speeds but this
    comes at the detriment of force standardisation and integration.
    This decentralised model of brigade-level procurement is attractive for those seeking to address
    criticisms of the MOD's "sluggish procurement processes". But the question is not whether to
    replicate the entire approach, which emerged from existential necessity to meet specific
    operational conditions, but rather to discern which elements might be adopted. The goal being to
    enhance MOD procurement without undermining the coherence that British industry and military
    requires. To do so it must understand the genesis of the AFU's brigade-level procurement model,
    consider the relative weight of opportunities vs risks and adapt them to Britain's own unique
    context.
    Origin Story
    The Ukrainian state in 2014 lacked sufficient funds to address its force's equipment deficits and
    regenerate units, which saw private citizens from across civil society fill the gap. This social
    phenomenon accelerated in February 2022 as numbers joining the AFU increased, with many of
    the new soldiers bringing significant personal wealth and business resource with them into service.
    Commerical enterprise and industrial companies became intertwined at the lowest tactical levels
    with frontline units. These in turn – which until recently were the largest AFU tactical formations –
    developed an entrepreneurial attitude to procurement.
    Thus emerged the 'decentralised' approach evident today. It grew organically to bypass traditional
    bureaucratic channels to enable speed of delivery and embed battlefield feedback into industrial
    procurement cycles. Critically, it also emerged in the absence of functional headquarters (for
    example Division and Corps) between the brigades and the AFU central command. The system
    was neither designed nor deliberate and as a result capacity varies across brigades. This is
    because of three fundamental tensions: tactical agility vs force standardisation; operational
    responsiveness vs industrial sustainability; and strategic mobilisation vs coherent force design.
    Tactical Agility vs Force Standardisation
    Brigade contracting has delivered a procurement cycle measured in days rather than months and
    years. Ukrainian forces can get drones, communications equipment and logistics enablement with
    unprecedented speed, allowing them to respond to Russian Forces in near-real time. CEPA noted
    the AFU's "response to the logistical challenges o...
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    13 mins
  • Why Small Powers are Not a Walkover in the Era of Technologies

    Why Small Powers are Not a Walkover in the Era of Technologies
    Dec 29 2025
    Incremental adaptation in modern warfare has astonished military observers globally. Ukraine's meticulously planned Operation Spider Web stands as a stark reminder of how bottom-up innovation combined with hi-tech solutions can prove their mettle on the battlefield. It has also exposed the recurring flaw in the strategic mindsets of the great powers: undermining small powers, their propensity for defence, and their will to resist. Having large-scale conventional militaries and legacy battle systems, great powers are generally guided by a hubris of technological preeminence and expectations of fighting large-scale industrial wars. In contrast, small powers don't fight in the same paradigm; they innovate from the bottom up, leveraging terrain advantage by repurposing dual-use tech, turning the asymmetries to their favour.
    History offers notable instances of great power failures in asymmetric conflicts. From the French Peninsular War to the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, these conflicts demonstrate the great powers' failure to adapt to the opponent's asymmetric strategies. This is partly due to their infatuation with the homogeneity of military thought, overwhelming firepower and opponents' strategic circumspection to avoid symmetric confrontation with the great powers.
    On the contrary, small powers possess limited means and objectives when confronting a great power. They simply avoid fighting in the opponent's favoured paradigm. Instead, they employ an indirect strategy of attrition, foster bottom-up high-tech innovation and leverage terrain knowledge to increase attritional cost and exhaust opponents' political will to fight. Similarly, small powers are often more resilient, which is manifested by their higher threshold of pain to incur losses, an aspect notably absent in great powers' war calculus.
    Operation Spider Web
    In the Operation Spider Web, Ukraine employed a fusion of drone technology with human intelligence (HUMINT) to attack Russia's strategic aviation mainstays. Eighteen months before the attack, Ukraine's Security Services (SBU) covertly smuggled small drones and modular launch systems compartmentalised inside cargo trucks. These drones were later transported close to Russian airbases. Utilising an open-source software called ArduPilot, these drones struck a handful of Russia's rear defences, including Olenya, Ivanovo, Dyagilevo and Belaya airbases. Among these bases, Olenya is home to the 40th Composite Aviation Regiment-a guardian of Russia's strategic bomber fleet capable of conducting long-range strikes.
    The operation not only damaged Russia's second-strike capability but also caught the Russian military off guard in anticipating such a coordinated strike in its strategic depth. Russia's rugged terrain, vast geography and harsh climate realities shielded its rear defences from foreign incursions. Nonetheless, Ukraine's bottom-up innovation in hi-tech solutions, coupled with a robust HUMINT network, enabled it to hit the strategic nerve centres, which remained geographically insulated for centuries.
    Since the offset of hostilities, Ukraine has adopted a whole-of-society approach to enhance its defence and technological ecosystem. By leveraging creativity, Ukraine meticulously developed, tested and repurposed the dual-use technologies to maximise its warfighting potential. From sinking Russia's flagship Moskva to hitting its aviation backbones, Ukraine abridged the loop between prototyping, testing, and fielding drones in its force structures.
    Underrated aspects?
    Another underrated aspect of Ukraine's success is the innovate or perish mindset. Russia's preponderant technology and overwhelming firepower prompted Ukrainians to find a rapid solution to defence production. Most of Ukraine's defence industrial base is located in Eastern Ukraine, which sustained millions of dollars' worth of damage from Russia's relentless assaults. Therefore, the Ukrainian government made incremental changes in Military Equipment ...
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    6 mins
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