Episodes

  • The Future of War – When States No Longer Own The Means of War

    The Future of War – When States No Longer Own The Means of War
    Jan 21 2026
    'Power, violence and legitimacy are fragmenting, and modern conflict is starting to behave accordingly'1
    Introduction
    It's hard to shake the feeling that conflict no longer behaves the way we expect it to. Wars don't end cleanly, responsibility is always blurred, and decisions with real consequences seem to be made everywhere and nowhere at once. We sense that something has changed, but rarely have the space to stop and ask why. This isn't an attempt to predict the next war or sound the alarm. It's an effort to make sense of why power, violence and accountability no longer behave the way we assume they do, and what that could mean for states and societies that still expect to manage them.
    Modern conflict is no longer defined by the Western conception of war as a discrete event led by states, fought by armies, and concluded by treaties. It has become a fluid spectrum shaped by states, private actors, technologies, algorithms, and societies that no longer share a common centre of gravity. The result is a geopolitical environment where the means of violence are distributed, authority is conditional, and conflict increasingly persists rather than resolves. That shift is hard to miss for anyone paying even casual attention to current events.
    Conflict Without Resolution
    In Ukraine, the fallout from Andriy Yermak's resignation in November 2025 was not just another political headline. It exposed a quieter competition over who shapes the end of the war, who decides the terms of security, and which interests gain access and influence when the war eventually winds down. It is a reminder that power has never been centralised in one place, and that competing interests are now shaping outcomes more openly than before. States still matter, but they no longer control the direction of conflict or the timing of peace alone. It shows how even in a major interstate war, control over outcomes is dispersed across political factions, private funders, foreign backers and societal forces.
    Power Beyond the State
    In Venezuela, tensions following the American strike has little to do with drugs, rhetoric or posturing alone. Politics matters, but so do the stakes beneath it: the largest proven oil reserves on earth, critical minerals and control of commercial advantage in a region where global competitors are increasingly active. This is the type of dispute where state power, private interests and informal networks blend into one another, and where none of these actors operate in isolation or according to national logic. It is a textbook case of a conflict shaped more by markets, resources and informal networks than by state intention.
    In the Middle East, Israel's simultaneous operations across Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and the West Bank show how modern warfare behaves when too many actors hold the capacity to escalate. Fronts no longer open and close; they bleed into one another, influenced not only by governments but by proxies, foreign backers and interests that do not wear national uniforms. The result is not confusion, it is complexity. Together, these overlapping fronts reinforce a world in which the power to escalate is no longer held by states alone.
    The Fracturing of Monopoly, Not the State
    These conflicts should not be lumped together, but they reveal a structural reality that they now share: the state is still powerful, but it is no longer the only force that matters. Too many actors now possess the means to shape violence, stall peace or influence outcomes from outside the traditional architecture of a government. The modern battlefield has matured into something closer to a marketplace of capabilities, incentives and interests than a domain controlled solely by states.
    Western strategic thinking has long struggled with this shift because its definitions of war remain narrow. Other traditions have always recognised a wider spectrum: the Russian military and strategic literature use the words borba ('struggle') to capture political, informational ...
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    20 mins
  • Ukraine's Brigade level Commercial Approach

    Ukraine's Brigade level Commercial Approach
    Jan 9 2026
    The Russo-Ukrainian War is a crucible of modern military innovation and has seen adaptation at
    every echelon, which the British Army is seeking to learn lessons from. In particular, the
    emergence of brigade-level commercial contracting within the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) has
    captured the imagination of its commanders. However, such an approach has inherent
    opportunities, risks and consequences. Ultimately, a Ukrainian brigade is not analogous to a British
    one and the Army has higher echelons of capable Division and Corps headquarters. Through a
    blended approach, these can serve to manage a system of 'decentralised' commerical contracting
    whilst mitigating the risks of tactical and institutional fragmentation. The British Army has to be
    discerning in which lessons it chooses to learn and adapt from.
    Over the course of Russo-Ukrainian War, beginning with the seizure of Crimea in 2014 and
    through the full-scale invasion in 2022, the AFU has "radically pivoted its approach to military
    innovation" and evolved a dual-track scheme to develop and procure military technologies. On the
    one hand, it operates a 'centralised' system orchestrated by the Ukrainian government and AFU
    command headquarters. This principally coordinates the flow of western-supplied equipment and
    seeks to manage sovereign industrial output. On the other, a 'decentralised' system has evolved
    with individual AFU brigades working directly with the commercial sector. By this latter approach,
    technology and equipment moves from factory to frontline at ever increasing speeds but this
    comes at the detriment of force standardisation and integration.
    This decentralised model of brigade-level procurement is attractive for those seeking to address
    criticisms of the MOD's "sluggish procurement processes". But the question is not whether to
    replicate the entire approach, which emerged from existential necessity to meet specific
    operational conditions, but rather to discern which elements might be adopted. The goal being to
    enhance MOD procurement without undermining the coherence that British industry and military
    requires. To do so it must understand the genesis of the AFU's brigade-level procurement model,
    consider the relative weight of opportunities vs risks and adapt them to Britain's own unique
    context.
    Origin Story
    The Ukrainian state in 2014 lacked sufficient funds to address its force's equipment deficits and
    regenerate units, which saw private citizens from across civil society fill the gap. This social
    phenomenon accelerated in February 2022 as numbers joining the AFU increased, with many of
    the new soldiers bringing significant personal wealth and business resource with them into service.
    Commerical enterprise and industrial companies became intertwined at the lowest tactical levels
    with frontline units. These in turn – which until recently were the largest AFU tactical formations –
    developed an entrepreneurial attitude to procurement.
    Thus emerged the 'decentralised' approach evident today. It grew organically to bypass traditional
    bureaucratic channels to enable speed of delivery and embed battlefield feedback into industrial
    procurement cycles. Critically, it also emerged in the absence of functional headquarters (for
    example Division and Corps) between the brigades and the AFU central command. The system
    was neither designed nor deliberate and as a result capacity varies across brigades. This is
    because of three fundamental tensions: tactical agility vs force standardisation; operational
    responsiveness vs industrial sustainability; and strategic mobilisation vs coherent force design.
    Tactical Agility vs Force Standardisation
    Brigade contracting has delivered a procurement cycle measured in days rather than months and
    years. Ukrainian forces can get drones, communications equipment and logistics enablement with
    unprecedented speed, allowing them to respond to Russian Forces in near-real time. CEPA noted
    the AFU's "response to the logistical challenges o...
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    13 mins
  • Why Small Powers are Not a Walkover in the Era of Technologies

    Why Small Powers are Not a Walkover in the Era of Technologies
    Dec 29 2025
    Incremental adaptation in modern warfare has astonished military observers globally. Ukraine's meticulously planned Operation Spider Web stands as a stark reminder of how bottom-up innovation combined with hi-tech solutions can prove their mettle on the battlefield. It has also exposed the recurring flaw in the strategic mindsets of the great powers: undermining small powers, their propensity for defence, and their will to resist. Having large-scale conventional militaries and legacy battle systems, great powers are generally guided by a hubris of technological preeminence and expectations of fighting large-scale industrial wars. In contrast, small powers don't fight in the same paradigm; they innovate from the bottom up, leveraging terrain advantage by repurposing dual-use tech, turning the asymmetries to their favour.
    History offers notable instances of great power failures in asymmetric conflicts. From the French Peninsular War to the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, these conflicts demonstrate the great powers' failure to adapt to the opponent's asymmetric strategies. This is partly due to their infatuation with the homogeneity of military thought, overwhelming firepower and opponents' strategic circumspection to avoid symmetric confrontation with the great powers.
    On the contrary, small powers possess limited means and objectives when confronting a great power. They simply avoid fighting in the opponent's favoured paradigm. Instead, they employ an indirect strategy of attrition, foster bottom-up high-tech innovation and leverage terrain knowledge to increase attritional cost and exhaust opponents' political will to fight. Similarly, small powers are often more resilient, which is manifested by their higher threshold of pain to incur losses, an aspect notably absent in great powers' war calculus.
    Operation Spider Web
    In the Operation Spider Web, Ukraine employed a fusion of drone technology with human intelligence (HUMINT) to attack Russia's strategic aviation mainstays. Eighteen months before the attack, Ukraine's Security Services (SBU) covertly smuggled small drones and modular launch systems compartmentalised inside cargo trucks. These drones were later transported close to Russian airbases. Utilising an open-source software called ArduPilot, these drones struck a handful of Russia's rear defences, including Olenya, Ivanovo, Dyagilevo and Belaya airbases. Among these bases, Olenya is home to the 40th Composite Aviation Regiment-a guardian of Russia's strategic bomber fleet capable of conducting long-range strikes.
    The operation not only damaged Russia's second-strike capability but also caught the Russian military off guard in anticipating such a coordinated strike in its strategic depth. Russia's rugged terrain, vast geography and harsh climate realities shielded its rear defences from foreign incursions. Nonetheless, Ukraine's bottom-up innovation in hi-tech solutions, coupled with a robust HUMINT network, enabled it to hit the strategic nerve centres, which remained geographically insulated for centuries.
    Since the offset of hostilities, Ukraine has adopted a whole-of-society approach to enhance its defence and technological ecosystem. By leveraging creativity, Ukraine meticulously developed, tested and repurposed the dual-use technologies to maximise its warfighting potential. From sinking Russia's flagship Moskva to hitting its aviation backbones, Ukraine abridged the loop between prototyping, testing, and fielding drones in its force structures.
    Underrated aspects?
    Another underrated aspect of Ukraine's success is the innovate or perish mindset. Russia's preponderant technology and overwhelming firepower prompted Ukrainians to find a rapid solution to defence production. Most of Ukraine's defence industrial base is located in Eastern Ukraine, which sustained millions of dollars' worth of damage from Russia's relentless assaults. Therefore, the Ukrainian government made incremental changes in Military Equipment ...
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    6 mins
  • As Russia's war continues, Great Powers are Competing.

    As Russia's war continues, Great Powers are Competing.
    Dec 17 2025
    As Russia launches the next phase of its Campaign, Great Powers are Competing.
    So why is the UK on the Bench?
    With overt and covert probing across Europe, a newly undeterred Russia has entered the next phase in its War with the fracturing West. Rapidly developed on Ukraine's battlefields, Russia is deploying its newfound technological advantage over the West to penetrate the breadth and depth of our continent.
    The UK needs to make a huge strategic choice today – do we want to put our Great Power pants on, match our ambitious words with the necessary resource, and compete – or do we let others write our destiny?
    To be a great power is to choose.
    Introduction
    The liberal world order is gone; we are living in an era of great power competition. The rest of the world knows this, but despite our collective nuclear powers, huge GDP, world leading universities, manufacturing base and tech sectors, the UK and key European nations are sat on the bench. Our ambitious Ends in Ukraine unmatched by the necessary Ways and Means. As Russia probes beyond Ukraine, our words – unmatched by deeds – draw obvious parallels with 1914 where miscalculation, uncontrolled escalation and the absence of a mechanism to manage great powers resulted in world war.
    Strategic Dissonance
    Nowhere is this clearer than with the UK's recent alphabet soup of grand strategy documents. The SDR, the NSS, the NIS all explicitly accept the arrival of Great Power Competition, and all fail to connect the Ways and Means necessary to compete in it or propose a mechanism for managing it.
    These national 'strategies' are risky. Firstly, they avoid the profound changes to our state machinery necessary for the management of Great Power Competition. Secondly, they allow political leaders to fudge, pretending they can both defend our nation and maintain unprecedented welfare spend. They can't. Thirdly, it is simultaneously bellicose whilst spiking our generals' guns. The limited increase in UK defence spend to ~3% arrives after the most likely window for great power conflict (2026-2029).
    Great Powers must be both able and willing
    To be a Great Power you must choose to be one. Russia, by force of will, is punching well above its weight, yet commentators overly focus on its relative GDP and Defence spend, somewhat missing the point. Russia is a Great Power precisely because it combines considerable mass and capability with the choice to deploy it – whether we like it or not. It has chosen to mobilise its populous and its industry, it has chosen to integrate rapid technological advances into its arsenal at the speed of relevance. The UK and other European nations manifestly have not.
    We chose not to match our Means to our Ends. When Ukraine was invaded, Boris Johnson set the ambitious (and noble) End State: 'Russia must fail in Ukraine and be seen to fail'. However, our atrophied state machinery failed to allocate the commensurate Ways and Means to achieve this goal. Critically, the safety mechanism failed to highlight the mismatch and force our leaders to choose: Either upgrade our ways and means or downgrade our Ends. This dynamic was replicated across Western capitals, compounding this strategic failure. The US distancing itself and turning off critical capabilities at no notice saw the entire game change – ruining the West's strategic planning assumptions.

    Consequently, Russia is attriting its way toward victory. With Western support fracturing and the frontline moving forward, Russia is winning, and Ukraine is losing. But this direction of travel affects far more than just Ukraine.
    Whilst Russia has historically always held the advantage of mass against European armies. The grand strategy changing moment is seeing Russia develop Technological Advantage over the West in Ukraine. Simultaneously exposed daily to Western technology and trialling Chinese and Iranian prototypes on Ukraine's battlefields, Russia is learning fast and increasingly able to integrate emerging, decisive t...
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    10 mins
  • The Thinking Soldier: Why Intellectual Curiosity Belongs In Your Belt Kit

    The Thinking Soldier: Why Intellectual Curiosity Belongs In Your Belt Kit
    Dec 10 2025
    "The nation that will insist on drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking by cowards."
    ~ Lt Gen Sir William F. Butler (1838-1910)
    In the British Army we pride ourselves on our readiness. Prowess in physical fitness, tactical decision-making and speed of action lie at the forefront of our profession. But there's one form of readiness that's often overlooked. It doesn't come from kit, drills or doctrine - it comes from the mind.
    Intellectual curiosity is the drive to ask questions. To explore ideas and seek deeper understanding that isn't just academic. It's a vital trait of the modern professional soldier and, if you're wearing the uniform, it belongs in your belt kit.
    Whether commanding or following, whether in a platoon or a brigade HQ, curiosity sharpens your edge. It helps you adapt faster, lead better and think deeper. It's not about having all the answers - it's about having the habit of asking better questions.
    Curiosity makes you Operationally Agile
    Today we are constantly reminded that the modern battlefield is ever changing and unpredictable. Hybrid threats, cyber warfare, AI, drones and information operations demand more than muscle memory. They demand mental agility. Soldiers who read widely, study adversary doctrine and reflect on historical campaigns build the cognitive flexibility to pivot under pressure. You don't need a PhD to be curious and it isn't just an officer sport. All ranks need the discipline to keep learning, even when the tempo is high: the tactical battle moves faster than the operational one.
    So what? Practical actions:
    1. Read one article by Friday each week from a defence journal, historical case study or foreign doctrine summary. Start with RUSI, Wavell Room, CHACR or the British Army Review. Share an insight on Monday.
    2. Join / start a Unit PME group - keep it informal, short, and relevant. One case, one question, 30 minutes, weekly or fortnightly, open discussion.
    3. Find time in your schedule to scan open-source on military and defence topics. Ask: "What would I do if I were them?" The Institute for the Study of War is excellent for both the Russo-Ukrainian War and the Gaza conflict.
    Curiosity isn't a distraction from the day job - it's preparation for operations. It's what lets you spot patterns others miss, challenge assumptions, and make decisions that stand up under scrutiny. In short, it's tactical advantage in mental form.
    Curiosity strengthens Ethical Command
    Contrary to popular belief (mostly how it's portrayed in films!), military leadership isn't simply about issuing orders. It's about making decisions that hold moral weight. Whether you're dealing with civilians in a conflict zone, navigating the grey areas of rules of engagement or fighting high intensity peer-on-peer war, ethical clarity matters. Soldiers who engage with philosophy, law and cultural studies are training their intellectual and moral reasoning like they train their marksmanship.
    So what? Practical actions:
    1. Investigate one case study per month from recent operations or historical dilemmas. Ask: "What would I do?" and consider the moral, ethical and tactical challenges.
    2. Discuss moral challenges with your team - use real-world examples, not hypotheticals. Keep it grounded.
    3. Explore cultural terrain before deployment - language basics, local customs, and historical context build empathy and reduce friction.
    Curiosity helps you see the human terrain more clearly. It gives you the language to explain your decisions, the empathy to lead with integrity and the confidence to act when the right choice isn't the easy one. In a profession built on trust, that matters.
    Curiosity builds a Better Army
    The British Army isn't just a fighting force - it's a living and learning organisation. Doctrine evolves, technology changes and the enemy adapts. If we want to stay ahead we need soldiers who think critically, challeng...
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    9 mins
  • Mission Partnerships in UK Defence: How to make them work

    Mission Partnerships in UK Defence: How to make them work
    Nov 21 2025
    Introduction: Defence as an engine for growth
    The government's Defence Industrial Strategy 2025 (DIS25) is clear that "business as usual" in procurement is no longer an option. Defence has been placed at the heart of the UK's modern industrial strategy, identified as one of eight priority sectors to drive economic growth and resilience.
    The strategy is frank in its diagnosis of the current system's weaknesses. Defence investment and economic strategy remain misaligned. Procurement processes have failed to adapt to an era where emerging technologies are reshaping warfare faster than at any point in living memory. Structural inefficiencies - from misaligned incentives to poor competition and weak exports - have left the UK industrial base struggling to deliver at the pace and scale required.
    DIS25 calls for something different: procurement that reduces waste, accelerates innovation, empowers SMEs, and crowds in private capital. It seeks to create a vibrant defence technology ecosystem, one where delivery is faster, risk is shared more equitably, and capability can spiral forward through rapid increments. The ambition is to transform the relationship between government and industry, so that defence becomes not just a consumer of technology but a driver of economic productivity.
    This context sets the stage for the idea of "mission partnership." The term is gaining currency across defence, but its meaning remains contested. At its best, it represents a practical shift in how programmes are delivered: a relationship structure where incentives, accountability and behaviours are aligned to outcomes. At its worst, it risks becoming a hollow buzzword, a softer synonym for "contractor" that re-badges old models without changing the fundamentals.
    The question this paper explores is whether mission partnerships can provide the practical vehicle through which the ambitions of DIS25 are realised. It argues that they can, but only if approached seriously: as a means of reshaping delivery behaviours, not simply as a new label for old practices.
    Why the system struggles today
    The weaknesses identified in DIS25 are not new. They are the product of decades of choices and cultural habits that have left the system ill-suited to today's demands.
    Policy pressure for pace, but institutional drag. Ministers have repeatedly signalled the need for faster delivery. The Integrated Procurement Model (IPM) commits Defence to deliver major equipment programmes within five years and digital programmes within three - targets that would have been unthinkable even a decade ago. Yet the approvals and governance cycles underpinning procurement remain rooted in Cold War-era timelines.
    Churn widens the knowledge gap. High turnover across MOD, particularly in technical and engineering roles, erodes institutional memory. Programmes lose continuity, forcing new teams to relearn the same lessons and repeat the same mistakes. This constant rotation undermines trust between customer and supplier, creating a public-private knowledge gap that grows wider with every cycle.

    Outsourcing legacies and switching costs. Two decades of outsourcing have left Defence dependent on a limited set of suppliers. Relationships have become brittle, with high switching costs that make even obvious changes operationally risky. Far from creating a competitive marketplace, outsourcing has often entrenched incumbents, leaving government hostage to long-term contract dependencies.
    Blurry boundaries and accountability. Too many programmes begin with contract mechanics rather than mission outcomes. Assurance is treated as paperwork to be satisfied, not as a shared responsibility for safety and performance. The result is a culture where suppliers do what the contract says, not what the mission requires.
    The combined effect is predictable: while policy demands agility and tempo, the system continues to generate delay.
    A shifting moment in defence innovation
    The environment, however, is shifting. T...
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    16 mins
  • Lessons from the Greco-Turkish War

    Lessons from the Greco-Turkish War
    Nov 19 2025
    The Greco-Turkish War was one of the largest and most consequential conflicts of the interwar period, spanning the period between World War I and World War II. It was a significant factor in the overall trajectory of the modern Middle East. The Hellenic Kingdom looked to expand its territory to connect with the Greeks of Asia Minor.
    In contrast, the nationalist forces under Mustafa Kemal looked to repel the Greek army and simultaneously expel foreign militaries to create a Turkish state. The war intertwined the Entente powers and revealed key lessons in logistics, the importance of a competent officer corps, and the use of key terrain to a defensive advantage, insights that can be studied for modern warfare today.
    Beginnings of the Greco-Turkish
    Against the backdrop of the capitulation of the Ottoman Empire, the remaining territories of the Middle East were placed under zones of influence (Sykes-Picot). In contrast, Asia Minor was put under full military occupation by several nations. The remnants of the Ottoman Empire were carved into a rump state by several nations.
    Turkish nationalist forces would conduct an insurgency led by Mustafa Kemal, a skilled military commander who had defeated British forces at Gallipoli, thereby securing their own state without foreign occupation. The Entente was overstretched, and its citizens felt the economic brunt of WWI, which made it hard for countries such as the UK and France to allocate sufficient forces capable of defeating the factions of Turkish nationalists. Instead, the British would support a key ally in the Mediterranean to defeat the Turkish army - the Hellenic Kingdom of Greece.
    During WWI, the Hellenic Kingdom, overseen by King Constantine I, initially decided to remain neutral despite having a pro-German government. This act caused anger among the Entente and pro-intervention Greek faction (the Venizelists), which resulted in Britain, France, and the latter exiling the then-monarch.
    The new government, led by Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos, adopted a core policy of irredentism regarding the historical Greek lands of Asia Minor, known as the Megali Idea. Furthermore, alongside Armenians, the remaining Greeks under the empire suffered from gruesome massacres amounting to genocide at the hands of the Ottomans in regions such as Eastern Thrace and Pontus, which also became another factor to initiate the war.
    With the military backing of London and Paris, who sought to quell the Kemalist insurgency that posed a threat to their zones of influence in Asia Minor, Athens initiated the Greco-Turkish War on May 15, 1919, during the naval landing in Smyrna.
    Early Hellenic Army Victories
    The Hellenic expeditionary army quickly secured the Greek mandate of Smyrna, then secured the outlying cities of Aydin, Menemen, Bergama, Ayvalik, and Cesme. After consolidating tens of thousands of troops, the British and Hellenic army would move to secure cities near the Sea of Marmara during the 1920 summer offensive.
    The Greek army captured the cities of Panormos, Izmit, Mudanya, Bursa, and Usak, securing much of Western Anatolia for both Athens and London. A Turkish counterattack at Gediz proved inconclusive before the winter set in.
    In Greece, King Alexander died from a monkey infection, and citizens felt from WWI and now feeling exhausted from an inconclusive campaign at the time in Asia Minor. A pro-royalist faction would win the upcoming elections, which would oust Venizelos as PM, who was replaced by Dimitrios Gounaris. The November 1920 elections would play a consequential turning point in the war going forward in 1921 and 1922.
    Athens Overstretched Its Logistics and Allied Support Wears Thin
    Instead of continuing to secure the coastlines where the Hellenic and British navies could provide maritime and logistical support, the Greek army pushed into Central Anatolia to defeat the Turkish nationalist forces for good. Later in the war, several Turkish factions organized into a more cohesive...
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    12 mins
  • "After me, the flood"

    "After me, the flood"
    Nov 14 2025
    Editor note: this article was first published on angrystaffofficer.com here.
    Much has been written elsewhere regarding the unforgivable sin of failing to plan for known contingencies. Whatever one thinks of the current changes undergoing the United States Army, the least controversial thing to be said about them is that they certainly represent a change from what has come before. And regardless of what one thinks, or refuses to think, about their merit, one can say one other thing for certain: they will eventually yield. Sooner or later, the "idiosyncrasies" of the current administration will again be replaced by "regular order". They must, the only question is how long will that transformation take. As members of the profession of arms we must at least consider how we will collectively re-establish some of the fundamental characteristics and capabilities of our military in the period that follows.
    This is essential, because any period of chaos or lack of resolve on our part has the potential to imperil national defense. Without a plan, what could be a very bumpy transition could give rise to an exploitable opportunity on the part of America's enemies to damage American interests, threaten America's overseas holdings, gain footholds in the "near-abroad", or threaten mainland America itself. The US Army's unshakable contract with the American people to fight and win the nation's wars by providing prompt, sustained land dominance across the full spectrum for conflict does not leave a lot of time for navel gazing during periods of uncertainty or of transition. In so far as that political uncertainty may unavoidably involve our Army, it is our responsibility to plan our way to the other side of it so that we may safeguard essential capabilities and be in a position to continue mission.
    Retaking the moral high ground (rule of law)
    The current administration's problematic relationship with the principles that inform the just use of force, such as the rule of law and the laws of land warfare, have been comprehensively documented elsewhere. Recent examples, in the form of exploding Venezuelan fishing boats accompanied by official pronouncements of indifference to the legal niceties of such action, make the direction we are moving in all too clear. What concerns us here is how best to put Humpty Dumpty back again after he has been comprehensively damaged.
    Respect for the law that underpins the just use of force, and especially the various international regimes that support it, is difficult to build and easy to dismantle. This is especially the case where the offending party has heretofore held a pre-eminent role in maintaining the status quo. As America abandons her post as the guardian of international law and of the rules-based international order to seek a role as one among several regional hegemons this will, by design, create a destabilizing environment for smaller nations and could lead to the readjustment of borders through conflict.
    Thinking through to a future where America may once again seek to champion a rules-based international order, how might we, as nation and as an Army, seek to incentivize participation by smaller nations who we may have earlier abandoned to their fate? I would suggest, ironically, that by maintaining our military strength and capabilities we may again be able to benignly bully the world in a multilateral rules-based order that transcends "the law of the jungle" as we did in the post WWII period. More than that, we would have to identify and maintain reservoirs of good practice and learning that survive the current period - such as the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court, independent centers for the study of international law (in so far as our institutional ones do not avoid becoming fatally compromised), and independent expertise to whom we might have resort when we need them to rebuild our own institutional capacity.
    Rebuilding academic infrastructure
    Similarly, the loss of academic...
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    8 mins