Showing results for "Military Engineering" in Weapons & Warfare

This one-volume anthology provides a comprehensive analysis of the role that air power has played in military conflicts over the past century. Comprising 16 essays penned by a global cadre of leading military experts, A History of Air Warfare chronologically examines the utility of air power from World War I to the second Lebanon war, campaign by campaign.

Das erste deutschsprachige Buch über die Atombombenlüge! Dieses Buch handelt von einer der größten PSYOPs der Menschheitsgeschichte. Selbst die alternativen Medien wagen es nicht, dieses Narrativ in Frage zu stellen. Denn kaum eine Lüge wird von den Kontrolleuren dieser Welt so gut geschützt wie die der Atombombe. Doch warum ist das so? Welchen Zweck erfüllt diese gigantische Lüge? Dieses Buch ist das Ergebnis jahrelanger Recherchen, die beweisen, dass es Atombomben nie gegeben hat!

William L. Laurence was fascinated with atomic science and its militarization. When the Manhattan Project drew near to perfecting the atomic bomb, he was recruited to write much of the government's press materials that were distributed on the day that Hiroshima was obliterated. That instantly crowned Laurence as one of the leading journalistic experts on the atomic bomb.

Nuclear Russia probes the juncture of history of science and technology, political and cultural history, and environmental history. It considers the atom in Russian society as a reflection of Leninist technological utopianism, Cold War imperatives, scientific hubris, public acceptance, and a state desire to conquer nature. Furthermore the audiobook examines the vital – and perhaps unexpected – significance of ethnicity and gender in nuclear history by looking at how Kazakhs and Nenets lost their homelands and their health in Russia in the wake of nuclear testing.

Why did the US intelligence services fail so spectacularly to know about the Soviet Union's nuclear capabilities following World War II? As Vince Houghton, historian and curator of the International Spy Museum in Washington, DC, shows us, that disastrous failure came just a few years after the Manhattan Project's intelligence team had penetrated the Third Reich and knew every detail of the Nazi's plan for an atomic bomb. What changed and what went wrong?